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This dissertation contains three distinct chapters. Each chapter utilizes a 
different type of data set and implements a different method to identify causal 
relationships regarding current issues in the economics of education and health.  
 The first chapter analyzes persistence of minority and female students in 
science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) majors in college. I utilize 
student-course level data for all students attending public four-year universities to 
determine whether having an instructor of the same race or same gender affects 
persistence of black and female students within STEM fields. I implement an 
instrumental variable strategy to control for self selection into courses. Results 
indicate that black students who have an introductory STEM course taught by a black 
instructor are significantly more likely to persist in a STEM field after the first year. 
However, female students are less likely to persist when their introductory STEM 
courses are taught by female instructors.  
 The second chapter (co-authored with Dr.John Cawley at Cornell University) 
is an evaluation of a program which offers financial incentives for weight loss. We 
analyze data from a company which provides a year-long health promotion program 
that offered financial rewards for weight loss. The types of incentive program varies 
by employer, with some offering steady payments for weight loss and others requiring 
participants to post a bond that is refundable based on achievement of weight loss 
goals. Comparing outcomes across groups, we find modest weight loss for participants 
 after one year. 
 The third chapter analyzes NCAA’s Proposition 16 which changed the 
admission requirements for freshmen student-athletes at Division I colleges. Using 
institutional level data, I examine how requiring higher SAT scores and high school 
GPA for eligibility standards affects enrollment and graduation rates for Division I 
colleges. I implement a difference-in-differences approach using Division II schools 
and non-student-athletes as the comparison groups. The results indicate that after 
Proposition 16, Division I schools recruited fewer black freshmen student-athletes 
when compared with Division II schools. Additionally, I find that higher admission 
standards did not increase graduation rates at Division I schools. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE EFFECT OF INSTRUCTOR RACE AND GENDER ON STUDENT 
PERSISTENCE IN STEM FIELDS 
 
Abstract 
The objective of this study is to determine if minority and female students are 
more likely to persist in a science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) major 
when they enroll in classes taught by instructors of their own race or gender. Using 
data from public four-year universities in the state of Ohio, I analyze first semester 
STEM courses to see if the race or gender of the instructor effects persistence of initial 
STEM majors in a STEM field after the first semester and first year. Results indicate 
that black students are more likely to persist in a STEM major if they have a STEM 
course taught by a black instructor. Similar to previous findings, female students are 
less likely to persist when more of their STEM courses are taught by female 
instructors.  
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Introduction 
  Historically, women and racial minorities have been underrepresented in 
science and engineering occupations. In an effort to increase the number of women 
and minorities in these occupations, many recent policies have focused on increasing 
the number of female and minority students who enter college in science, technology, 
engineering, or math (STEM) fields. However, the NSF’s Science and Engineering 
Indicators report (2008) finds that students who begin college as STEM majors have a 
lower probability of receiving a degree in their initial field than students in other 
majors. Of even greater concern is that women and historically disadvantaged racial 
minorities who initially intend to major in a STEM field are the least likely to persist 
toward a degree in one of these fields.  
 It is hypothesized that students experience better educational outcomes when 
they are able to interact and associate with faculty who are of their own race or gender. 
Provided that this hypothesis was true, one approach to increase the persistence of 
women and minority students is to increase the number of female and minority faculty 
in STEM departments. Previous studies indicate that female instructors in STEM 
courses do not increase the likelihood that female students take more STEM courses in 
subsequent semesters (Bettinger & Long, 2005; Carrel et al, 2010). These studies even 
suggest that female students who take STEM courses taught by female instructors are 
less likely to major in STEM fields. There is abundant research on instructor gender 
matching, but a lack of research on instructor race matching at the college level. There 
is research that links positive academic outcomes to having an own race teacher in 
elementary and secondary school (Klopfenstein, 2005; Dee, 2004), yet there is little 
research to date that identifies a causal effect of having an own-race instructor on 
academic outcomes in college. The primary objective of this study is to estimate the 
effect of having own-race instructors on persistence in STEM fields using within 
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institution variation of the number of black faculty assigned to teach introductory 
courses. A secondary objective is to examine the effects of own-gender instructors on 
persistence of initial STEM majors.  
 The outcome of interest in the current study is persistence in a STEM field 
major, with persistence being defined as entering college with the intent of majoring in 
a STEM field and remaining in a STEM field major in subsequent semesters. The 
focus is placed on the intermediate measurement of intended major in order to identify 
when students begin to transition from STEM to non-STEM fields while in college. 
Many students change their major during their first years of college (40 percent after 
the first year and 74 percent after the second year). As findings from previous research 
indicate that faculty have the strongest influence on students within the first years of 
their college experience (Canes & Rosen 1995; Solnick, 1995), this study focuses on 
the student-faculty interaction occurring during the first semester of the freshmen year.  
 I use a linear probability model to estimate the effect of STEM instructor’s 
race on student persistence in STEM fields. The key explanatory variable is the 
number of STEM courses in which a student enrolls in the first semester that are 
taught by black instructors. I use data from the Ohio Board of Regents, which includes 
course enrollment data for first time freshmen who enrolled between 1998 and 2002 in 
all public 4-year institutions in the state of Ohio. One of the empirical challenges of 
identifying casual effects of instructors is that students may differentially select into 
courses based on the race or gender of the instructor. For example, the data used in 
this study indicate that courses taught by a black instructor have a 2.4 to 10.4 percent 
higher fraction of black students enrolled in the course.  
 To address this selection issue, I instrument for whether a STEM course is 
taught by a black instructor with the fraction of STEM courses taught by black 
instructors at a given institution during a given semester. The fraction of STEM 
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courses taught by black instructors within an institution varies due to several factors 
such as recent hires, course assignments, sabbaticals, and faculty leaving the 
institution. I also include a measure for the total number of black faculty in STEM 
fields within each institution to capture factors that may change within an institution 
over time.  I use a similar instrumental variable to estimate the causal effects of 
female instructors on persistence. 
My IV estimates indicate that having a black instructor increases the likelihood 
that black students persist in a STEM field. However, In contrast to past studies using 
elementary and secondary school student samples (Dee, 2004), I find that for college 
students, black instructors have no effect on persistence of white students in STEM 
fields. These results illustrate the positive effect that own-race instructors can have on 
academic outcomes early on in college for underrepresented minorities. In addition, I 
find that female instructors do not have a positive effect on the likelihood that female 
students persist in a STEM field.  
 
Background 
 Several theories have been presented to explain why having an instructor with 
similar racial or gender characteristics might increase a student’s academic 
performance. One of the explanations most thoroughly studied in past literature is the 
idea that faculty members serve as a mentor or role model for students, and having a 
mentor or role model of the same gender or race increases academic performance 
(Jacobi, 1991; Crisp & Cruz, 2009). A consistent finding over time is that students 
tend to choose role models who have the same characteristics as themselves (Erku & 
Mokros, 1984; Jacobi, 1991; and Karunanayake & Nautu, 2004). 
 Multiple studies have examined whether having a teacher of the same gender 
increases academic performance of students in elementary and secondary school. 
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Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979, Nixon and 
Robinson (1999) show that girls who have a female teacher in high school have higher 
levels of educational attainment. Using data from the National Education Longitudinal 
Study of 1988, Dee (2007) finds that having an own-gender teacher in 8th grade 
increases test scores and student engagement with academic subjects. Additionally, in 
a sample of high school aged students in Sweden, Holmlund and Sund (2006) show a 
positive association between grades of female students and taking classes from female 
teachers.  
Several studies have examined whether female role models have positive 
effects on the academic performance of female college students. In the past it has been 
difficult to identify specific role models and mentors due to data constraints, so studies 
have utilized the gender composition of university departments as a proxy for role 
models or possible mentors. Rothstein (1995) utilizes data from the National 
Longitudinal Study of 1972 and find a positive association between the percentage of 
female faculty at the school and the probability that a female student attains an 
advanced degree. Canes and Rosen (1995) look within three institutions and find no 
evidence that the share of women on a department’s faculty leads to an increase in the 
share of female majors within that department. Robst, Keil, and Russo (1998) use data 
from the State University of New York at Binghamton and examine the fraction of 
classes that are taught by female instructors. Their results indicate a positive 
correlation between the percentage of science and math courses taught by female 
instructors and retention of female students in those majors. 
 Although these studies describe a positive association between female 
instructors and academic outcomes for female students, they may not identify a causal 
relationship. More recent studies have focused on estimating the causal effect of an 
instructor’s gender on academic outcomes of female college students, while 
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accounting for possible selection issues. Results of these more recent studies remain 
inconclusive as to whether there are short term benefits for female students from 
having a female instructor in initial STEM courses.   
Hoffman and Oreopoulos (2009) examine the effect of female instructors in 
first semester courses on academic performance and the number of additional same-
subject courses taken. They assert that introductory courses are chosen independent of 
gender of instructors and provide evidence that sections taught by female instructors 
(within a specific course) do not have a significantly higher share of female students 
than sections taught by male faculty. They show that female students’ average grade 
performance is not significantly higher when their introductory courses are taught by 
female instructors, but male student performance decreases with female instructors. 
Pooling men and women and estimating the effect of same-sex instructor, they show 
that having an own-gender instructor in a math or science course actually decreases 
female grade performance and the number of same-subject courses taken in later 
years.  
Carrel et al (2009) rely on random assignment of both students and faculty that 
is unique to the Air Force Academy. They find that high ability female students, 
defined by SAT scores, who have their introductory STEM courses taught by a female 
instructor perform better in these and additional courses and are more likely to receive 
a degree in a STEM field. However, when examining all female students, they find 
that having a female instructor in a STEM course increases performance in that course 
but has no significant effect on performance in subsequent courses and no effect on 
graduating in a STEM field. Due to the unique nature of the university where the data 
for this particular study comes from, the results may not generalize to other academic 
institutions.  
 Bettinger and Long (2007) use a more representative sample, including all 
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public 4-year universities in the state of Ohio, to examine the effect that female 
instructors have on female students in STEM fields. They look at whether having a 
female instructor for a course in a particular field increases the probability of taking 
additional courses in that field and receiving a degree in that field. To address 
differential selection into courses, they instrument for having a course taught by a 
female instructor with a measure of the fraction of courses within a department taught 
by female instructors. They find mixed results of the effect of female STEM faculty on 
female students. For example; female faculty have a positive effect on female students 
taking additional courses  in mathematics and geology fields but a negative effects in 
the fields of biology and physics.  
 Examining the relationship between having an instructor of the same race and 
student academic outcomes, Rask and Bailey (2002) find that minority students who 
take more courses in a field from a professor of the same race are more likely to major 
in that field. Additional studies have examined the effect that minority teachers have 
on the academic outcomes of minority students in elementary and secondary school. 
Ehrenberg & Brewer (1995) use data from the mid 1960’s and find evidence that black 
high school students who take classes from black are receive higher test gains on 
average. Using more recent data, Ehrenberg, Goldhaber, and Brewer (1995) show that 
a teacher’s racial characteristics have no effect on how much students learn between 
the 8th and 10th grades. Using data from Texas high schools, Klopfenstein (2005) finds 
that increasing the percentage of black math teachers has a significant effect on the 
probability that black students in a geometry class will enroll in more advanced math 
classes. Using data from Tennessee’s Project STAR, Dee (2004) utilizes the project’s 
random assignment of students and teachers to classes and finds that having an own-
race teacher significantly increases the math and reading test scores of black students. 
In addition, teachers are more likely to give higher ratings to students who are of the 
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same race as themselves (Ehrenberg et al. 1995, Dee 2005). While there is 
documented evidence for a positive effect of teacher-student racial matching in 
elementary and secondary school, the relationship that exists between professor and 
student may be quite different at the college level. There is a need for research on the 
effect of having a same-race teacher for college students. 
 This study contributes to the existing literature examining the effects of own-
race and own-gender instructors on academic outcomes of STEM majors in two ways. 
First, it is the first quasi-experimental study that identifies the own race instructor 
effect on persistence in a STEM field for college students. Second, it re-examines the 
effect that female instructors have on the decision of college students to persist toward 
a degree in a STEM field in a different manner than previous studies. It changes the 
level of analysis from course-student level to student-semester level. This allows me to 
simultaneously control for other courses that the student enrolls in within a given 
semester. Additionally, this study uses variation in the number of black and female 
instructors assigned to teach STEM courses within an institution over time to identify 
the causal effect of an own-race or own-gender instructor on persistence. 
 
Data 
 The data for this study comes from the Ohio Board of Regents, which collects 
data from all public universities within the State of Ohio. One strength of such a data 
set is that it contains a large number of observations of underrepresented groups of 
students in STEM fields detailed enough to match students to the instructor of each 
course in which they enrolled. The data consist of first-time freshmen who enrolled in 
one of the 13 public 4-year universities in the state of Ohio between 1998 and 2002. 
Three sources of student-level data are included in the present analysis: (1) 
information the school receives when the student first enrolls, including gender, race, 
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age, standardized test score (ACT or SAT) and state of residence; (2) information the 
school records each term, such as term grade point average and intended major field of 
study, and (3) the courses in which each student enrolled for each term up to six years 
after initial enrollment.  In addition course records identify the instructor of each 
course. I then merge in administrative faculty files containing information on each 
faculty member, including race, gender, tenure status, rank, and highest degree earned. 
This allows me to match each student with the instructor of each course in which they 
enrolled. 
One of the difficulties of examining the effect of minority instructors on 
academic outcomes is that many data sets have a small number of observations of 
either the number of minority students or minority faculty. The Ohio data used in this 
study includes information on 14,448 black students and 1,613 black faculty, a sample 
size that makes it possible to estimate the effects of having a black instructor on 
academic outcomes for black college students. Another advantage of using data from 
Ohio is that the demographic characteristics of students who attend public 4-year 
universities in the state are similar to nationally representative samples.1  
The five cohorts of first-time freshmen included in the data utilized in this 
analysis include over 155,000 students, of whom 22.1 percent initially intended to 
major in a STEM field. Throughout this paper, I aggregate subfields into a general 
STEM or non-STEM classification. Table 1.1 examines initial major choice and shows 
that female students initially constitute a lower percentage of STEM majors than non-
STEM majors. Additionally, ACT scores are 2.5 points higher (≈90 SAT points) 
among STEM majors.2  Significant differences arise when examining the fraction of  
B 
                                                 
1
 For a more detailed argument of external validity see Bettinger (2007) 
2
 The ACT is a college entrance exam similar to the SAT. A 21.7 on the ACT is 
approximately equivalent to a 1000 and a 24.2 is equivalent to a 1090 on the SAT. 
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics 
STEM Non-STEM
Variable Mean Mean Mean p-value
female 0.538 0.344 0.593 0.000
white 0.828 0.824 0.829 0.035
black 0.093 0.083 0.096 0.000
asian 0.022 0.038 0.018 0.000
other 0.057 0.055 0.057 0.066
ACT score 22.3 24.2 21.7 0.000
[4.284] [4.252] [4.137]
Engineering 0.088
Life/Physical Science 0.083
Technology/Math 0.050
Business 0.149
Communication 0.050
Education 0.098
Humanities 0.195
Social Science 0.096
Vocational 0.086
Unknown 0.105
N 156,056 34,687 121,369
 
 
students from a particular subgroup who initially declare a STEM major. Among men 
in the sample, 31.8 percent initially declare a STEM major compared to only 14.3 
percent of female students. In terms of initial racial differences; 22.3 percent of white 
students initially declare a STEM field major compared to 20 percent of black 
students. 
 Faculty characteristics also differ between STEM fields and non-STEM fields. 
As shown in Table 1.2, about a third of STEM field faculty is female compared to half 
in non-STEM fields. While the fraction of white faculty is similar between STEM and 
non-STEM fields, within STEM fields there is a lower fraction of black faculty 
compared with non-STEM fields. STEM fields have a higher proportion of faculty 
who have earned doctoral degrees, are of higher academic rank, are tenured and are 
employed full-time. Within STEM fields, there are significant gender and racial  
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Table 1.2 Characteristics of the Faculty 
Full Sample STEM Non-STEM
Variable Mean Mean Mean
Female 0.447 0.299 0.501 ***
White 0.871 0.874 0.869
Black 0.055 0.031 0.064 ***
Asian 0.037 0.064 0.027 ***
Other race 0.037 0.031 0.040 ***
Highest Degree
Ph.D. 0.344 0.432 0.311 ***
Masters 0.326 0.251 0.355 ***
Other degree 0.314 0.300 0.317 ***
Rank
Professor 0.119 0.168 0.101 ***
Associate 0.117 0.142 0.108 ***
Assistant 0.129 0.127 0.130
Other rank 0.619 0.546 0.644 ***
Apointment
Full-time 0.206 0.228 0.198 ***
Part-time 0.288 0.268 0.296 ***
Grad assistant 0.261 0.223 0.273 ***
Observations 32,555 8,737 23,818
Note: Asterisks represent significant difference in means, *** 1%, ** 5%, and *10%
 
differences in faculty characteristics. As shown in Table 1.3, the same proportion of 
black faculty in STEM fields have a Ph.D. as white faculty, but they are less likely  
to be full professor.  Female faculty are less likely to have a Ph.D., be a full or 
associate professor, and be full-time employed.  
 If the ultimate policy goal is to increase the number of female and minority 
students who major in a STEM field, then outcomes of interest should include 
indicators that are correlated with receiving a degree in a STEM field. Previous studies 
have examined grade performance and probability of enrolling in additional courses in 
a particular field as indicators for earning a degree (Hoffman & Oreopoulos, 2009; 
Carrell et al., 2009; Bettinger & Long, 2005). These outcomes may not provide the  
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Table 1.3 Racial and Gender Differences of Faculty within STEM Fields 
White Black Male Female
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean
Highest Degree
Ph.D. 0.340 0.340 0.441 0.241 ***
Masters 0.333 0.407 *** 0.295 0.382 ***
Other degree 0.327 0.253 *** 0.264 0.376 ***
Rank
Professor 0.123 0.067 *** 0.185 0.044 ***
Associate 0.115 0.149 *** 0.148 0.086 ***
Assistant 0.125 0.159 *** 0.131 0.131
Other rank 0.637 0.626 0.536 0.739 ***
Apointment
Full-time 0.205 0.271 *** 0.240 0.175 ***
Part-time 0.297 0.291 0.266 0.321 ***
Grad assistant 0.272 0.203 *** 0.218 0.324 ***
Observations 28,358 1,784 17,632 14,227
Note: Asterisks represent significant difference in means, *** 1%, ** 5%, and *10%
 
best measures of intent to earn a degree in a STEM field since enrolling in additional 
STEM courses may be the result of a general education requirement needing to be 
fulfilled and not necessarily due to interest in that field or intent to graduate in it.  
Whether the individual intends to major in a STEM field major is a better indicator 
that can be used to show progress toward the goal of receiving a degree in a STEM 
field. Therefore, the outcome which is of most interest in this study is whether a 
student who initially intends to major in a STEM field continues in a STEM field as 
his or her intended major in subsequent terms in which he or she enrolls.  
 
Patterns of Persistence 
 In this study, persistence is defined as continuing on in the field of the initial 
major during subsequent semesters that the student is enrolled in classes. The data for 
this measure are constructed from administrative records that contain the student’s 
intended major for each term the student is enrolled. The focus of this analysis is on 
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STEM fields in general; thus changing majors within STEM fields is counted as 
persisting in a STEM field (i.e. a student who initially declares a major in chemistry 
and then changes to a biology major is considered as persisting in a STEM field). The 
same is true for students who transfer within non-STEM field majors.  
Lower persistence rates exist among those students who initially enter STEM 
fields compared with those who initially enter non-STEM fields. Table 1.4 shows the 
cumulative distribution of persisting in initial major, changing majors, and dropping 
out of school. Among initial STEM majors, 91.6 percent remain STEM majors by the 
second semester of their freshman year. However, only 71.8 percent of initial STEM 
majors remain in a STEM field by the beginning semester of their sophomore year. 
Persistence rates for non-STEM majors are significantly higher, with 95.8 percent 
persisting in a non-STEM field after the first semester and 83.4 percent after the first 
year3. Also, a larger fraction of students in non-STEM majors drop out of college 
compared with students in STEM majors. Among initial STEM majors, those 
individuals who either change majors or drop out of school, 14 percent do so after the 
first semester, 47 percent do so within in the first year of school, and 75 percent within 
the first two years.   
In addition to differences in persistence rates across fields of study, there are 
significant differences in persistence rates between gender and racial groups within 
STEM field majors. Table 1.5 shows the unconditional means of outcomes after each 
semester. The results in the top panel of Figure 1.1 indicate that, even after controlling 
for institution and cohort, white students are more likely to persist in STEM fields than  
  
                                                 
3
 The persistence rates between STEM and non-STEM majors is significantly 
different at the 1% level 
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Table 1.4 Cumulative Distribution of Persistence  
Initial Non-STEM Majors (N=121,369)
Remain in Non-STEM Change to STEM Dropout
1st Semester 0.958 0.011 0.032
2nd Semester 0.834 0.028 0.142
3rd Semester 0.802 0.032 0.166
4th Semester 0.738 0.040 0.222
5th Semester 0.727 0.040 0.233
6th Semester 0.688 0.040 0.272
Initial STEM Majors (N=34,687)
Remain in STEM Change to Non-STEM Dropout
1st Semester 0.916 0.065 0.018
2nd Semester 0.718 0.174 0.108
3rd Semester 0.654 0.217 0.129
4th Semester 0.551 0.272 0.177
5th Semester 0.530 0.287 0.183
6th Semester 0.484 0.298 0.218
 
black students. However, controlling for a measure of prior achievement by including 
ACT test scores, the white-black persistence gaps decreases by almost one-half. This 
provides suggestive evidence that prior preparation is an important factor in explaining 
the racial differences of persistence in STEM fields. The bottom panel shows that 
males are more likely to persist in STEM fields than female students. However, ACT 
test scores do not explain the difference in persistence rates between males and 
females as the male-female persistence gap is virtually unchanged when controlling 
for test scores. 
 While there are racial and gender differences in persistence in STEM fields, 
there also exist such differences in non-STEM fields. As shown in Figure 1.2, there is 
a racial gap in 3-year  
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Table 1.5 Cumulative Distribution of Persistence by Race and Gender 
Conditional on being an initial Non-STEM major 
White
Remain in STEM Change to Non-STEM Dropout
1st Semester 0.911 0.064 0.016
2nd Semester 0.723 0.172 0.095
3rd Semester 0.661 0.214 0.116
4th Semester 0.562 0.270 0.159
5th Semester 0.542 0.283 0.166
6th Semester 0.497 0.296 0.198
Black
Remain in STEM Change to Non-STEM Dropout
1st Semester 0.875 0.089 0.036
2nd Semester 0.574 0.211 0.214
3rd Semester 0.505 0.266 0.229
4th Semester 0.380 0.307 0.314
5th Semester 0.359 0.328 0.313
6th Semester 0.302 0.326 0.372
Male
Remain in STEM Change to Non-STEM Dropout
1st Semester 0.931 0.051 0.018
2nd Semester 0.751 0.139 0.110
3rd Semester 0.694 0.173 0.133
4th Semester 0.597 0.220 0.182
5th Semester 0.578 0.235 0.187
6th Semester 0.530 0.247 0.223
Female
Remain in STEM Change to Non-STEM Dropout
1st Semester 0.888 0.093 0.018
2nd Semester 0.654 0.243 0.104
3rd Semester 0.578 0.302 0.121
4th Semester 0.462 0.372 0.166
5th Semester 0.439 0.387 0.174
6th Semester 0.396 0.395 0.209
 
 
persistence rates in both STEM and non-STEM fields. This measure of persistence 
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counts individuals who change to non-STEM majors and dropouts as not persisting, 
yet individuals who dropout and individuals who change majors may be very different.  
To examine the decision of persisting in STEM majors versus changing majors, I 
condition on not dropping out of school. Once conditioning on not dropping out, the 
persistence gaps remains among STEM fields but black are marginally more likely to 
persist in non-STEM fields. This indicates that the  
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Figure 1.1 Racial and Gender Persistence Gap of Initial STEM Majors by Semester 
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Figure 1.2 Three Year Persistence Rates by Race  
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Figure 1.3 Three Year Persistence Rates by Gender 
unconditioned persistence gap among non-STEM majors is being driven by students 
who drop out. Figure 1.3 shows that men are more likely to persist in STEM fields, 
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but less likely to persist in non-STEM fields.  
 
Methods 
The objective of this study is to test whether students who have their STEM 
courses taught by an instructor with similar racial or gender characteristics are more 
likely to persist in a STEM field major. To test this hypothesis, I focus on the first 
semester courses of students who initially declare a STEM major. The basic 
econometric model is represented with the following equation: 
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where ijkePersistenc is a binary outcome equal to one if student i at school j in 
cohort k is a STEM major in the second semester given that student i’s initial major 
was in a STEM field. The key variable of interest is the number of black STEM 
instructors, which gives the effect of black instructors on white students, and the 
interaction of number of black STEM instructors and black, which yields the effect of 
black STEM instructors on black students. The vector iX controls for student 
characteristics such as race, gender, ACT test score4, and state of residence. Also 
included in the equation are controls for observable characteristics of instructors such 
as rank, tenure status, full-time, and graduate assistant (λ). To account for structural 
differences between majors within STEM fields, θ is a set of dummy variables for the 
initial major of student i. There may also be specific programs implemented by 
individual universities that may affect a student’s decision to remain in a STEM field 
                                                 
4
 A dummy variable is included to account for the 16% of the sample who have 
missing ACT scores. 
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major; thus I also include institutional fixed effects ( jδ ), and cohort fixed effects ( kδ ) 
to account for differences over time. I also use this same model to estimate the own 
gender effect of instructors on persistence. 
I start by assuming that first semester courses are chosen independent of the 
characteristics of the instructors of the course. Based on this assumption, I use a linear 
probability model to estimate the correlation between the number of STEM courses 
that are taught by black instructors and the outcome of persisting in a STEM field. 
However, there are some possible reasons why the assumption that students randomly 
sort into classes in their first semester may not be a valid assumption. For example, 
although students sign up for classes before coming to campus, they can access 
information about potential instructors online or there may be opportunities to switch 
classes during the first week of school.  
The selection into courses may occur at two different levels. First, students 
may decide to take a course within a field of study, and then enroll in a course which 
is taught by an instructor of similar characteristics, or what I refer to as between-
course selection. The second type of selection occurs when students decide on a 
course, and then enroll in a section of the course based on faculty race or gender 
(within-course selection). Following the method of Hoffman and Oreopoulos (2009), I 
test both type of selection by examining the relationship between the race of the 
instructor and the racial composition of the students in the course and show results in 
Table 1.6. Within field selection shows that once controlling for faculty 
characteristics, institution and cohort fixed effects, and field fixed effects, STEM 
courses taught by a black instructor have a 5.7 percentage point increase in the fraction 
of black students 
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Table 1.6 Selection into Courses by Race 
Outcome is the Fraction of Students Who are Black 
 
Non-STEM Course STEM Course
Black Instructor 0.190*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.024*** 0.214*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.028***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Constant 0.105*** 0.089*** 0.078*** 0.253*** 0.098*** 0.078*** 0.029*** 0.094**
[0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.083] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.038]
Observations 63370 63370 63370 63370 25332 25332 25332 25332
R-squared 0.08 0.43 0.44 0.76 0.06 0.42 0.44 0.73
faculty characteristics x x x x x x
Institution FE x x x x x x
Cohort FE x x x x x x
Field FE x x
Course FE x x
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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enrolled in the course. With an average class size of 32.86, this increase represents, on 
average, 1.87 more black students when a course is taught by a black instructor. 
Within-course selection shows even less selection, once including course fixed effects, 
a black instructor is correlated with a 2.8 percentage point increase in the fraction of to 
about .92 of a student on average. Though modest in magnitude, this does provide 
suggestive evidence that black students do select into courses taught by black 
instructors. 
Similar to the analysis examining selection into courses based on race of 
instructor, I examine the gender of the instructor influences the gender composition of 
the class (see Table 1.7). Between-course selection shows that having a female 
instructor in a STEM course increases the fraction of female students by 3.7 
percentage points (1.2 more female students). Within-course selection shows that 
having a female instructor is not correlated with the fraction of female students who 
enroll in the course, indicating that selection may be less of an issue when examining 
the effect of own-gender instructor on persistence. 
To address possible selection bias issues, I use the fraction of STEM courses 
taught by black instructors at an institution to instrument for the number of STEM 
courses taught by black instructors. Since institutional and cohort fixed effects are 
included in the model, the variation of the instrument comes from within institution 
changes over time in the number of courses taught by black faculty and the total 
number of courses offered. This variation can be driven by recent hires, course 
assignments, sabbaticals, job loss, or other within institution factors. I also control for 
the total number of black STEM instructors at each institution in the first stage 
equation to proxy for time-varying institutional factors that might be correlated with 
the type of instructors assigned to introductory courses and a student’s decision to 
persist in a STEM field.  
  
 
Table 1.7 Selection into Courses by Gender 
Outcome is the Fraction of Students Who are Female 
 
Non-STEM Course STEM Course
Female Instructor 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.012*** 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.037*** 0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Constant 0.530*** 0.514*** 0.531*** 0.658*** 0.435*** 0.359*** 0.097*** 0.549***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.005] [0.133] [0.002] [0.007] [0.007] [0.056]
Observations 57608 57608 57608 57608 20259 20259 20259 20259
R-squared 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.64 0.02 0.07 0.31 0.78
faculty characteristics x x x x x x
Institution FE x x x x x x
Cohort FE x x x x x x
Field FE x x
Course FE x x
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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 This instrument is similar to that used by Bettinger and Long (2005), but can 
be seen as an improvement because it aggregates fields to classify them as STEM 
versus non-STEM. Bettinger and Long conduct their analysis on more refined 
measures of field of study (i.e. physics, chemistry, biology, etc.) and use proportion of 
courses taught by female faculty to instrument for having a female instructor. While 
this controls for selection within a field, there may be selection across closely related 
fields of study based on faculty characteristics. For example, the choices of students 
may not just be between sections of the same chemistry course, but between different 
courses within STEM fields. Thus, aggregating to a higher level better accounts for the 
type of selection that occurs.  
 
Results 
Effect of Racial Matching 
  The baseline model examines the relationship between the number of black 
instructors in STEM courses and persistence of students in a STEM field after the first 
semester and after the first year. OLS makes the assumption that factors related to a 
student enrolling in a class taught by a black instructor are not correlated with 
persistence. Results in Table 1.8 indicate that under OLS assumptions, black students 
are equally as likely to persist as non-black students. Additionally, the number of 
black STEM instructors has a positive influence on persistence of non-black students, 
as the coefficient on Black STEM Instructor indicates a 2.5 percentage point increase 
in persistence. The interaction term between Black STEM Instructors and Black yields 
the effect of the number of STEM courses taught by black faculty on the persistence of 
black students. After the first semester, there is not a statistical relationship between 
the number of black instructors and persistence on black STEM majors. Looking at 
persistence after the first year of school, OLS results indicate that black students are 
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4.4 percentage points less likely to persist after one year. However, each additional 
black instructor that a black student has in a STEM course is correlated with a 5.5 
percentage point increase in persistence, which closes the white-black persistence gap. 
Other results from the baseline model indicate that higher ACT scores are correlated 
with increased rates of persistence. Also, holding constant the number of non-STEM 
courses, each additional STEM course in which a student enrolls is associated with a 
1.9 and 5.5 percentage point increase in persistence after the first semester and first 
year respectively.  
OLS estimations. To account for this possible bias, I instrument for the number of 
black STEM instructors with the fraction of STEM courses that are taught by black 
faculty at the institution.  The lower panel of Table 1.8 shows the first stage 
estimation results for the number of black STEM instructors. Since the baseline 
equation includes both the number of black STEM instructors and the number of black 
instructors interacted with black, I use the instrument and the instrument interacted 
with black (student race) to create the first stage estimations. In both cases the 
instruments are highly correlated with the number of black instructors in STEM 
courses and have large F statistics. The second stage results show that there continues 
to be no statistical effect on persistence after the first semester. However, examining 
transitions that occur by the end of the first year; it appears black students are 
significantly more likely to persist when more of their initial STEM courses are taught 
by black instructors.  
While Table 1.8 looks at the number of black STEM instructors, Table 1.9 
redefines the explanatory variable of interest as having at least one black instructor in  
an introductory STEM course.  89 percent of black students who have at least 1 black  
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Table 1.8 Regression Results: Outcome is Persist in STEM Field Major  
(Number of Black STEM Instructors) 
[0.006] [0.008] [0.010] [0.013]
Black STEM Instructor 0.025*** -0.014 0.027** -0.114
[0.008] [0.074] [0.012] [0.118]
Black STEM Instructor * Black -0.024 0.101 0.055** 0.552***
[0.017] [0.073] [0.028] [0.118]
ACT 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.011***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Female -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.077*** -0.077***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of Non-STEM Courses -0.001 -0.002 -0.014*** -0.015***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of STEM Courses 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.055*** 0.053***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Constant 0.847*** 0.850*** 0.473*** 0.487***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.022] [0.023]
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05
First Stage Estimation
Frac Courses Taught by Black Faculty 0.863 0.863
[0.143] [0.143]
F-Stat 12.08 12.08
Frac Courses Taught by Black Faculty*Black 0.99 0.99
[0.024] [0.024]
F-Stat 81.48 81.48
Observations 34,687 34,687 34,687 34,687
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.9 Regression Results: Outomce is Persistin STEM Field Major 
(At Least One Black Faculty) 
After First Semester After First Year
OLS IV OLS IV
Black  -0.002 -0.012 -0.045*** -0.086***
[0.006] [0.008] [0.010] [0.014]
Black STEM Instructor 0.028*** -0.011 0.030** -0.11
[0.008] [0.088] [0.013] [0.142]
Black STEM Instructor * Black -0.021 0.117 0.081** 0.637***
[0.020] [0.084] [0.031] [0.135]
ACT 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.011***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Female -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.077*** -0.077***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of Non-STEM Courses -0.001 -0.002 -0.014*** -0.015***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of STEM Courses 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.055*** 0.053***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Constant 0.846*** 0.850*** 0.473*** 0.488***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.022] [0.023]
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05
First Stage Estimation
Frac Courses Taught by Black Faculty 0.0638 0.0638
[0.130] [0.130]
F-Stat 9.78 9.78
FracCourses Taught by Black Faculty*Black 0.886 0.886
[0.021] [0.021]
F-Stat 84.64 84.64
Observations 34,687 34,687 34,687 34,687
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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STEM instructor have only one black instructor teach a STEM course. Results 
outlined in Table 1.9 follow the same pattern as Table 1.8, including a statistically 
insignificant effect of having a black instructor on persistence of black students after 
the first semester. Having at least one black instructor in a STEM course has a positive 
and significant effect on persistence of black students after the first year, with the 
point estimate becoming larger when using instrumental variables.  
Another specification redefines persistence as being equal to one if the 
individual persists in a STEM field and zero if the individual changes majors, or in 
other words, persistence conditional upon not dropping out. Table 1.10 examines this 
outcome with the key explanatory variable being defined as the number of black 
STEM instructors. For black students it appears that there is no effect of additional 
STEM courses taught by black instructors on persistence after the first semester but a 
positive and significant effect on persistence after the first year. Table 1.11 examines 
the binary measure of having at least one black faculty, instead of the count variable, 
and the results are very similar. In all these specifications the point estimates on the  
interaction of Black STEM Instructor and Black student are smaller in magnitude than 
when they are not conditioning upon enrolling in school.  
 The general finding is that black instructors do not have a significant impact on 
black students’ persistence in a STEM field after the first semester. It does seem to be 
the case that having a black instructor has a significant impact on persistence of black 
students after the first year. The magnitude of the effect is hard to pin down. OLS 
results would suggest the effect is between five to eight percentage points. IV results 
would suggest that the real effect, once accounting for selection bias, is much larger. 
Maybe equally important is that black instructors do not have a negative impact on 
non-black students. The effect was ranged from two to three percentage points under 
OLS, but was insignificant with instrumental variables. There is evidence to suggest  
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Table 1.10 Regression Results: Outcome is Persist in STEM Field Major Conditional 
on Enrollment (Number of Black Stem Instructors) 
After First Semester After First Year
OLS IV OLS IV
Black  0.007 0 0 -0.025*
[0.005] [0.007] [0.009] [0.014]
Black STEM Instructor 0.020*** -0.061 0.015 -0.071
[0.007] [0.069] [0.012] [0.106]
Black STEM Instructor * Black -0.022 0.075 0.054* 0.395***
[0.016] [0.069] [0.028] [0.137]
ACT 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.008***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Female -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.097*** -0.097***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of Non-STEM Courses -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.023*** -0.023***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of STEM Courses 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.043*** 0.042***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004]
Constant 0.885*** 0.888*** 0.632*** 0.639***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.021] [0.022]
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05
First Stage Estimation
FracCourses Taught by Black Faculty 0.842 0.842
[0.144] [0.144]
F-Stat 11.72 11.72
FracCourses Taught by Black Faculty*Black 0.97 0.97
[0.025] [0.025]
F-Stat 77.42 77.42
Observations 34,057 34,057 30,946 30,946
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.11 Regression Results: Outcome is Persist in STEM Field Major Conditional 
on Enrollment (At Least One Black Faculty)
After First Semester After First Year
OLS IV OLS IV
Black  0.007 0 0 -0.026*
[0.005] [0.008] [0.009] [0.015]
Black STEM Instructor 0.024*** -0.07 0.019 -0.075
[0.007] [0.082] [0.012] [0.126]
Black STEM Instructor * Black -0.022 0.084 0.067** 0.439***
[0.018] [0.079] [0.032] [0.156]
ACT 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.008***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Female -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.097*** -0.097***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of Non-STEM Courses -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.023*** -0.023***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of STEM Courses 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.043*** 0.042***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Constant 0.884*** 0.889*** 0.632*** 0.639***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.021] [0.022]
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05
First Stage Estimation
FracCourses Taught by Black Faculty 0.651 0.651
[0.132] [0.132]
F-Stat 9.9 9.9
FracCourses Taught by Black Faculty*Black 0.879 0.879
[0.022] [0.022]
F-Stat 81.32 81.32
Observations 34,057 34,057 30,946 30,946
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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that not having an own –race teacher has negative impacts in the K-12 setting (Dee, 
2007), yet it is evident that this is not the case at the college level. 
 
Effect of Gender Matching  
 The baseline model of the effect of the number of female STEM instructors on 
persistence of initial STEM majors is shown in Table 1.12. The OLS model shows that 
female students are 3.9 percentage points less likely to persist in a STEM field than 
male students after the first semester. Having a female instructor in a STEM course 
has a small negative effect on the persistence of male students and no effect on the 
persistence of female students. However, when examining persistence after the first 
year, female students are 7.3 percentage points less likely to persist and each 
additional female instructor lowers the persistence of male students by 1.4 percentage 
point after the first year. There is no statistical relationship between own-gender 
instructors and persistence of female students after the first year. 
As was shown in Table 1.7, it appears that there is between course sorting into 
courses taught by female instructors but not within course sorting. If the selection 
process is that students choose a course and then sort into sections based on faculty 
gender, then IV results should be similar to OLS results. However, in many instances 
IV results differ greatly from OLS result indicating that the selection into courses 
occurs across courses rather than within courses. Once controlling for selection into 
courses, the IV results indicate that female students are significantly less likely to 
persist when their STEM courses are taught by female instructors. The magnitude is 
around 26 percentage points, but is imprecisely measured and only significant at the 
10% level. This effect is only found after the first semester, as the coefficient in the IV 
estimation is not statistically significant.  
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Table 1.12 Regression Results: Outcome is Persist in STEM Field Major 
(Number of Female STEM Instructors)
After First Semester After First Year
OLS IV OLS IV
Female -0.039*** 0.118 -0.073*** 0.028
[0.004] [0.080] [0.006] [0.121]
Female STEM Instructor -0.005* -0.036 -0.014*** -0.066
[0.003] [0.043] [0.005] [0.065]
Female STEM Instructor * Female 0.005 -0.258* -0.006 -0.169
[0.004] [0.135] [0.007] [0.203]
ACT Score 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.012*** 0.011***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
black -0.004 -0.001 -0.039*** -0.037***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.010]
asian 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.066*** 0.066***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.012] [0.013]
other -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.011]
Number of Non-STEM Courses -0.002 -0.001 -0.014** -0.012**
[0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
Number of STEM Courses 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.047*** 0.050***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
Constant 0.857*** 0.812*** 0.514*** 0.484***
[0.013] [0.027] [0.020] [0.040]
R-squared 0.03 0.06 0.02
First Stage Estimation
Frac Courses Taught by Female Faculty 0.619 0.619
[0.126] [0.126]
F-Stat 9.84 9.84
Frac Courses Taught by Fem Faculty*Female 0.307 0.307
[0.082] [0.082]
F-Stat 7.52 7.52
Observations 34,373 34,373 34,373 34,373
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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 These results are fairly robust under other specifications. Table 1.13 redefines 
the explanatory variable of interest as having at least one female STEM instructor. 
Tables 1.14 and 1.15 look at the outcome of persistence conditional upon not dropping 
out of school and use both a count measure and binary measure of female instructors 
in STEM courses. OLS results indicate that male students have persistence rates 1 to 2 
percentage points lower when matched with a female STEM instructor. Once 
controlling for selection, the point estimates remain negative and get larger in absolute 
value, but are not statistically significant but are always negative in sign. OLS also 
indicates that female students are about one percentage point more likely to persist 
after the first semester when courses in STEM fields are taught by female faculty, and 
equally as likely to persist after the first year. However, the instrumental variables 
suggest that female students are significantly less likely to persist in a STEM major 
after the first semester and first year when courses are taught by female instructors.  
 In a similar study, Carrel et al (2010) find that on average there are no effects 
on academic outcomes when female students enroll in STEM courses taught by a 
female faculty. However, when they look at a subsample of students who are high 
ability, they find significant and positive effects of high ability females who have 
female instructors. They use the 75th percentile of the SAT math section (score of 700) 
as the cutoff for high ability. While the data in this study does not include a detailed 
breakdown of the ACT exam, I can divide the sample in two ways. First, I set the 
cutoff at the 75th percentile of the distribution of scores (ACT score of 25). Second, I 
set the cutoff at 30, which represents high ability students5. Table 1.16 defines high 
ability students as those in the 75th percentile and the results show that having a female 
instructor has a negative effect on persistence after the first semester and first year.  
  
                                                 
5
 Using other cutoffs above 30 provides similar results 
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Table 1.13 Regression Results: Outcome is Persist in STEM Field Major 
(At Least One Female Faculty) 
After First Semester After First Year
OLS IV OLS IV
Female -0.041*** 0.06 -0.074*** 0.022
[0.004] [0.052] [0.007] [0.082]
Female STEM Instructor -0.012*** -0.039 -0.018*** -0.103
[0.004] [0.052] [0.007] [0.082]
Female STEM Instructor * Female 0.011* -0.211* -0.006 -0.211
[0.006] [0.115] [0.010] [0.181]
ACT Score 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.012*** 0.012***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
black -0.004 -0.001 -0.039*** -0.036***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010]
asian 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.066*** 0.066***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.012] [0.013]
other -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
[0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.011]
Number of Non-STEM Courses -0.002 -0.003 -0.014*** -0.015***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of STEM Courses 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.047*** 0.055***
[0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007]
Constant 0.858*** 0.836*** 0.516*** 0.499***
[0.013] [0.018] [0.020] [0.028]
R-squared 0.03 0.06 0.03
First Stage Estimation
Frac Courses Taught by Female Faculty 0.286 0.286
[0.088] [0.088]
F-Stat 6.54 6.54
Frac Courses Taught by Fem Faculty*Female 0.388 0.388
[0.056] [0.056]
F-Stat 13.92 13.92
Observations 34,373 34,373 34,373 34,373
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.14 Regression Results: Outcome is Persist in STEM Field Major Conditional 
on Enrollment (Number of Female STEM Instructors) 
After First Semester After First Year
OLS IV OLS IV
Female -0.040*** 0.126* -0.098*** 0.081
[0.004] [0.074] [0.006] [0.114]
Female STEM Instructor -0.008*** -0.023 -0.012*** -0.058
[0.003] [0.041] [0.004] [0.064]
Female STEM Instructor * Female 0.008** -0.273** 0.003 -0.294
[0.004] [0.125] [0.006] [0.192]
ACT Score 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.008***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
black 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.004
[0.005] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010]
asian 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.061*** 0.062***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.012] [0.012]
other 0.005 0.004 0.021** 0.016
[0.006] [0.007] [0.010] [0.011]
Number of Non-STEM Courses -0.007** -0.006* -0.024*** -0.024***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of STEM Courses 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.040*** 0.046***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
Constant 0.890*** 0.843*** 0.660*** 0.611***
[0.012] [0.025] [0.019] [0.037]
R-squared 0.03 0.05
First Stage Estimation
Frac Courses Taught by Female Faculty 0.619 0.619
[0.126] [0.126]
F-Stat 9.84 9.84
Frac Courses Taught by Fem Faculty*Female 0.307 0.307
[0.082] [0.082]
F-Stat 7.52 7.52
Observations 33,743 33,743 30,652 30,652
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.15 Regression Results: Outcome is Persist in STEM Field Major Conditional 
on Enrollment (At Least One Female Faculty) 
After First Semester After First Year
OLS IV OLS IV
Female -0.043*** 0.061 -0.097*** 0.035
[0.004] [0.045] [0.006] [0.069]
Female STEM Instructor -0.013*** -0.02 -0.020*** -0.085
[0.004] [0.049] [0.006] [0.077]
Female STEM Instructor * Female 0.015*** -0.216** 0.003 -0.285*
[0.006] [0.099] [0.010] [0.153]
ACT Score 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.009***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
black 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.007
[0.005] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010]
asian 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.061*** 0.061***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.012] [0.012]
other 0.005 0.004 0.020** 0.018*
[0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.011]
Number of Non-STEM Courses -0.007** -0.008** -0.024*** -0.027***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of STEM Courses 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.040*** 0.049***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007]
Constant 0.891*** 0.867*** 0.661*** 0.636***
[0.012] [0.016] [0.019] [0.025]
R-squared 0.03 0.05
First Stage Estimation
Frac Courses Taught by Female Faculty 0.286 0.286
[0.088] [0.088]
F-Stat 6.54 6.54
Frac Courses Taught by Fem Faculty*Female 0.388 0.388
[.056] [.056]
F-Stat 13.92 13.92
Observations 33,743 33,743 30,652 30,652
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.16 Regression Results: Outcome is Persist in STEM Field Major  
(Number of Female STEM Instructors, ACT Score ≥ 25 (75th Percentile)) 
After First Semester After First Year
OLS IV OLS IV
Female -0.033*** 0.081 -0.068*** -0.011
[0.005] [0.050] [0.009] [0.082]
Female STEM Instructor -0.008** 0.005 -0.014** -0.057
[0.004] [0.047] [0.007] [0.078]
Female STEM Instructor * Female 0.002 -0.202** -0.004 -0.098
[0.006] [0.088] [0.010] [0.146]
ACT Score 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.013***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
black -0.001 -0.01 -0.014 -0.018
[0.015] [0.016] [0.025] [0.026]
asian 0.012 0.009 0.061*** 0.060***
[0.010] [0.011] [0.018] [0.018]
other 0 -0.008 0.001 -0.003
[0.010] [0.011] [0.018] [0.019]
Number of Non-STEM Courses -0.001 -0.002 -0.023*** -0.023***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008]
Number of STEM Courses 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.056*** 0.058***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008]
Constant 0.825*** 0.802*** 0.483*** 0.471***
[0.026] [0.029] [0.045] [0.048]
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.02
First Stage Estimation
Fract Courses Taught by Female Faculty 0.286 0.286
[0.088] [0.088]
F-Stat 6.54 6.54
Frac Courses Taught by Female Faculty*Female 0.388 0.388
[.056] [.056]
F-Stat 13.92 13.92
Observations 14,021 14,021 14,021 14,021
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.17 Regression Results: Outcome is Persist in STEM Field Major  
(Number of Female STEM Instructors, ACT Score ≥ 30 ) 
After First Semester After First Year
OLS IV OLS IV
Female -0.033*** 0.081 -0.068*** -0.011
[0.005] [0.050] [0.009] [0.082]
Female STEM Instructor -0.008** 0.005 -0.014** -0.057
[0.004] [0.047] [0.007] [0.078]
Female STEM Instructor * Female 0.002 -0.202** -0.004 -0.098
[0.006] [0.088] [0.010] [0.146]
ACT Score 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.013***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
black -0.001 -0.01 -0.014 -0.018
[0.015] [0.016] [0.025] [0.026]
asian 0.012 0.009 0.061*** 0.060***
[0.010] [0.011] [0.018] [0.018]
other 0 -0.008 0.001 -0.003
[0.010] [0.011] [0.018] [0.019]
Number of Non-STEM Courses -0.001 -0.002 -0.023*** -0.023***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008]
Number of STEM Courses 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.056*** 0.058***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008]
Constant 0.825*** 0.802*** 0.483*** 0.471***
[0.026] [0.029] [0.045] [0.048]
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.02
First Stage Estimation
Frac Courses Taught by Female Faculty 0.286 0.286
[0.088] [0.088]
F-Stat 6.54 6.54
Frac Courses Taught by Female Faculty*Female 0.388 0.388
[.056] [.056]
F-Stat 13.92 13.92
Observations 14,021 14,021 14,021 14,021
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Redefining the cutoff of high ability at an ACT score of 30 shows that there are no 
negative effects on persistence of female student for additional STEM courses which 
are taught female instructors (See Table 1.17).  
 The general result that female students are less likely to persist when they have 
a female instructor in an introductory STEM corresponds with findings in previous 
studies. Hoffman & Oreopoulos (2009) find that female students who have female 
instructors in math and science courses get lower grades in those courses. There is 
evidence to suggest that female students are more sensitive to grades, and are less 
likely to take additional courses than male students when they receive poorer grades 
(Rask & Tiefenthaler, 2008). Therefore, if female students receive lower grades in a 
STEM course when taught by a female instructor, then this could explain why female 
students are less likely to persist in STEM fields. Subsequently, multiple studies find 
that female students enroll in significantly fewer classes in STEM fields when initial 
courses are taught be female faculty (Hoffman & Oreopoulos, 2008; Bettinger & 
Long, 2005). 
 
Conclusion 
The current study seeks to explain why minority and female students are less 
likely to persist in STEM fields. The black-white persistence gap begins to emerge 
after the first semester, and continues to grow after each semester. After 3 years, about 
30 percent of initial STEM majors who are black are still in a STEM related field, 
compared to almost half of white students. Prior preparation, as measured by ACT 
scores, explains about half of the black-white persistence gap for minority STEM 
majors. This indicates that there is much to do in both preparing underrepresented 
minorities prior to enrolling in college as well as during the first few years in their 
college experience to be able to succeed in STEM related majors. There are also 
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distinct patterns of persistence between male and female STEM majors. The gender 
persistence gap is smaller in magnitude than the black-white persistence gap, but 
emerges even after the first semester and continues to increase after the sixth semester 
(40 percent persistence for women versus 53 percent for men). However, controlling 
for prior preparation does not significantly degrease the gender. This suggests that 
more could be done within the college setting to improve persistence of women in 
STEM majors. 
The main objective of this study was to test the hypothesis that students who 
have STEM courses taught by an instructor of their own race or gender are more likely 
to persist in a STEM major. The empirical evidence provided in this study suggests 
that black students who enroll in STEM courses taught by black instructors are more 
likely to persist in a STEM field after the first year. Furthermore, this study also 
suggests that female students are less likely to persist in a STEM field when courses in 
these fields are taught by female instructors. 
Findings from this study would suggest that increasing the number of black 
faculty teaching introductory STEM courses would have a positive influence on 
improving persistence of black students. But the limitation of the study is that it does 
not identify the mechanism driving the result. If black instructors serve as mentors to 
black students, then maybe schools could do more to facilitate and foster mentor 
relationships between students and faculty. If the presence of black instructors in the 
classroom serve as role models or help improve student’s view of self efficacy, then 
just having black faculty in the department could have the same effect. What is really 
needed is future research designed to understand the mechanism, such that policy 
implications can be provided to increase the representation of minority students 
persisting toward a degree in a STEM field.  
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CHAPTER 2 
OUTCOMES IN A PROGRAM THAT OFFERS FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR 
WEIGHT LOSS6 
 
 
Abstract 
A large percentage of Americans are attempting to lose weight at any given 
time but the vast majority of weight loss attempts fail.  Researchers continue to 
search for safe and effective methods of weight loss, and this paper examines one 
promising method - offering financial rewards for weight loss. 
This paper studies data on 2,407 employees in 17 worksites who participated in 
a year-long worksite health promotion program that offered financial rewards for 
weight loss.  The intervention varied by employer, in some cases offering steady 
quarterly rewards for weight loss and in other cases requiring participants to post a 
bond that would be refunded at year’s end conditional on achieving certain weight loss 
goals.  Still others received no financial incentives at all and serve as a control group.  
We examine the basic patterns of enrollment, attrition, and weight loss in these three 
groups. 
Weight loss is modest.  After one year, it averages 1.4 pounds for those paid 
steady quarterly rewards and 3.6 pounds for those who posted a refundable bond, 
under the assumption that dropouts experienced no weight loss.  Year-end attrition is 
as high as 76.4%, far higher than that for interventions designed and implemented by 
researchers.    
 
 
    
                                                 
6
 This chapter is co-authored with John Cawley 
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Introduction 
A variety of approaches are being used to treat obesity and encourage weight 
loss.  One promising strategy based on psychology and behavioral economics is to 
offer financial incentives for weight loss.  Obesity is costly to health insurance 
companies (Finkelstein et al. 2003) and employers (Cawley et al. 2007), so for either 
or both of those organizations to offer monetary incentives for enrollees or employees 
to lose weight could be mutually beneficial. 
This paper studies data from a firm that coordinates a program of financial 
incentives for weight loss in various worksites in the U.S.  We study attrition and 
weight loss in three types of incentive programs: one that offers no financial rewards 
for weight loss, one that offers quarterly payments that rise in value with the amount 
of weight loss, and a third that takes deposits (bonds) that are only refunded if the 
employee achieves a specific weight loss goal and also includes a quarterly lottery for 
those who have lost weight.  Relative to previous studies of weight loss in response 
to financial incentives, strengths of this study include a large sample size (2,407) and a 
long intervention (one year).   
A 2007 Institute of Medicine report on obesity prevention set the immediate 
next step – which it described as an essential priority action for the near future – as 
“learning what works and what does not work and broadly sharing that information.” 
(IOM 2007, p. 410).  It also notes that “All types of evaluation can make an 
important contribution to the evidence base upon which to design policies, programs, 
and interventions.” (Ibid, p. 4).  This paper makes a contribution to that effort by 
documenting enrollment, attrition, and weight loss in one interesting and promising 
intervention.  This paper presents basic patterns in the data; a subsequent paper will 
estimate regression models to test specific hypotheses about attrition and weight loss. 
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Conceptual Framework and Previous Literature  
For obese people, weight loss would likely result in substantial benefits.7  For 
example, the health benefits of modest weight loss (defined as 5-10% of starting 
weight) include decreased blood pressure and cholesterol and a 25% reduction in 
mortality risk for type 2 diabetics (Vidal, 2002).  Weight loss may also improve 
quality of life (Ford et al. 2001).   There may also be financial benefits.  Cawley 
(2004) finds a causal impact of weight on wages, and that obese white females earn 
roughly 11 percent less than healthy-weight white females.  Finkelstein et al. (2003) 
calculate that, relative to the healthy weight, the obese incur $125 higher annual out-
of-pocket health care costs.  With two-thirds of Americans overweight or obese 
(Ogden et al. 2006), and given these potential benefits of weight loss, it may not be 
surprising that 46 percent of all American women and 33 percent of all American men 
are trying to lose weight (Bish et al. 2005). 
Most people fail in their attempts to lose weight8, and many of those who are 
successful in losing weight regain it in a short period of time. 9  For example, in one 
community-based study of weight gain prevention (Crawford et al., 2000), most 
                                                 
7
 There are two ways researchers have sought to measure the benefits of weight loss.  The first is to 
examine changes in outcomes associated with losing weight.  The second is to compare the outcomes 
of individuals of different weight, and assume that the difference in outcomes is due to the difference in 
weight.  Each has its limitations: weight loss studies often lack power, and comparisons across weight 
levels are confounded by differences in unobserved characteristics.  Vidal (2002) assesses the evidence 
on the benefits of weight loss and concludes that modest weight loss (5-10% of initial body weight) 
improves cardiovascular risk factors and helps prevent or delay the onset of type 2 diabetes and 
hypertension. 
8
 Some obese individuals are able to lose weight by modifying their behaviors: eating less and 
exercising more.  In the select group enrolled in the Weight Control Registry, all of whom have lost at 
least 30 pounds and kept it off for at least one year, 44.6% report losing the weight entirely on their 
own, that is, without the help of a commercial program, physician, or nutritionist (Wing and Phelan, 
2005).  Clearly such statistics do not generalize to the population; anyone who failed at initial weight 
loss is ineligible for this registry of people who maintained weight loss for a year. 
9
 Conventional wisdom is that virtually no one succeeds at maintaining weight loss.  This perception 
has been traced back to a 1959 study of 100 obese individuals in which only 2 percent maintained loss 
of 20 pounds or more two years after the treatment (Stunkard and McLaren-Hume 1959; Wing and 
Phelan 2005).  However, the 1959 study was based on a crude diet intervention with negligible support 
or follow-up so its poor results may not generalize to today’s much more intensive interventions. 
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(53.7%) participants gained weight in the first twelve months, three-quarters gained 
weight over three years, and only 4.6% lost weight and maintained the loss for three 
years.  
Theory and evidence from psychology and behavioral economics provide 
several explanations for why so many weight loss attempts fail.  First, the benefits of 
weight loss are not salient.  For example, foregone quality of life and lost wages are 
not visible and therefore they are frequently unrecognized as opportunity costs 
(Bastiat, 1850).   
A second possible explanation for repeated failure at weight loss is that the 
benefits of weight loss may not be immediate.  Improvements in health and labor 
market outcomes may not occur for some time after weight loss, and Ainslie (1975) 
finds consistent evidence that there is a decline in the effectiveness of rewards as the 
rewards are delayed from the time of choice.   
A third explanation for repeated failure at weight loss is that, contrary to the 
standard economic model of discounted utility (Samuelson 1937), people may 
discount hyperbolically, which produces time-inconsistent preferences (Ainsley 1975).  
In this context, time inconsistent preferences mean that people want to do what is in 
their long-run interest (lose weight), but they consistently succumb to the temptation 
to eat and be sedentary.  Thaler and Shefrin (1981) describe individual decision-
making as a battle between a farsighted planner (who in this context wants to diet) and 
a myopic doer (who in this context wants to eat and be sedentary).   
One intervention, financial rewards for weight loss, may offer a solution to the 
problems of salience, immediacy, and time-inconsistency.  Financial rewards, even 
though they may be dwarfed in value by the other benefits of weight loss, have the 
benefit of being salient, with their amount and delivery date known with certainty in 
exchange for clearly defined objectives.  Even small financial incentives can be 
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effective because research has found that people tend not to compare payoffs to their 
income or wealth but instead “bracket” them - consider them in isolation (Read et al. 
1999; Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  Lotteries may be particularly cost-effective 
incentives for healthy behavior.  People tend to overweight the probability of 
unlikely events and underweight the probability of likely events (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979), implying that lotteries can be more attractive than certain payments 
even if the two have equal expected values.  Financial rewards can also be paid 
immediately, before other benefits of weight reduction may be realized.   
Financial rewards can also be structured to help people with time-inconsistent 
preferences stay committed to weight loss.  In general, pre-commitment devices may 
help people with time-inconsistent preferences empower their farsighted planner 
(Strotz 1956; Laibson 1997).  In this context, one could allow people to post a bond 
that is automatically forfeited if they fail to achieve their weight loss goals.  Such a 
bond allows a person to influence their own future decisions by increasing the 
punishment for succumbing to short-run temptation.  People tend to exhibit loss 
aversion – they dislike losing their own money more than they like winning an equal 
amount of someone else’s money (Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Camerer 2005), 
which suggests that a posted bond may be more effective than a reward of the same 
size.  Using a bond to increase adherence to a weight-loss regimen does not 
guarantee success.  Even individuals who are aware of their time-inconsistent 
preferences may still be partially naive in that they overestimate their future willpower 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001) and as a result may either post too small a bond or 
have too much faith in the bond as a precommitment device. 
Motivated by these theories and findings, several businesses now help 
employers offer financial incentives for employee weight loss.  In addition, several 
businesses help consumers post bonds that are only refunded if one achieves specific 
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weight loss goals.  The William Hill betting agency in the U.K. books wagers that the 
bettor cannot achieve a specified weight loss in a specific period of time and verifies 
the weight loss with a medical examination (Burger and Lynham 2008).10  A 
company named stickK.com11 that was founded by Yale economists Ian Ayres and 
Dean Karlan allows people to post bonds that are forfeited if they fail to meet their 
weight loss goal.  However, verification is weak: success in achieving one’s goal is 
determined (and refunds are made) based on either the honor system or through 
verification by a third party chosen by the bettor, and if the third party doesn’t submit 
a report the self-report of the bettor is accepted. 
The contribution of this paper is to examine outcomes in a program that offers 
various financial rewards (including certain payments, lotteries, and refundable bonds) 
for weight loss.  The outcomes we examine include attrition and weight loss, both in 
pounds and as a percentage of baseline weight.   
A substantial literature confirms that financial incentives influence healthy 
behaviors.  Kane et al. (2004) review 42 studies of the effect of economic incentives 
on preventive behaviors such as immunization, smoking cessation, and exercise; they 
find that the economic incentives were effective at changing behavior in 73% of 
studies.  Financial incentives form the basis for an innovative substance abuse 
treatment program known as contingency management.  A meta-analysis found 
overwhelming evidence that such incentives raise compliance (drug abstinence) by an 
average of 30 percent (Lussier et al., 2006).  Consistent with bracketing, even small 
financial incentives have proven effective; for example, as little as $2.50 for a single 
negative test result for cocaine (Higgins et al., 2002). 
                                                 
10
 This market is relatively small – the annual number of applications for such bets is roughly 200 
(Burger and Lynham, 2008) 
11
 The website’s Frequently Asked Questions page states that the company’s name includes two K’s 
because "K" often symbolizes "contract" in legal writing. 
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Specific to the current context, there is mixed empirical evidence on the extent 
to which weight loss is responsive to financial rewards.  A recent review and meta-
analysis (Paul-Ebhohimhen and Avenell 2007) identified nine published randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs) that used guaranteed financial incentives (i.e. certain 
payments, not lotteries) for weight loss, with a follow-up of at least one year.  The 
meta-analysis was unable to reject the null hypothesis of no effect of financial rewards 
on weight loss; it calculated a mean weight loss of 0.4 kg at 12 months, which was not 
statistically significant.  A broader set of studies (including, e.g., those with non-
randomized designs or shorter follow-up) are listed in Appendix Table 2.1.12  
Relative to past studies, ours has several advantages.  This study has a 
relatively large sample size (2,407); for comparison, the sample size of all published 
RCTs of financial incentives for weight loss combined totals 424 (treatment N=252, 
control N=172) (Paul-Ebhohimhen and Avenell, 2007).  The intervention studied by 
this paper also covers a relatively long time period (one year).  Moreover, we 
examine data from a real-world intervention rather than one constructed by and 
overseen by researchers, which is important because a criticism of studies of weight 
loss programs is that it is unclear how the results of pilot programs generalize to real-
world implementation.  A limitation of this study, however, is that it is opportunistic 
data; individuals were not randomly assigned to different incentive schedules for 
weight loss. 
 
Description of the Intervention 
Our data come from a company (that we will call Company X) that helps 
employers provide financial incentives for their employees to lose weight; specifically, 
                                                 
12
 There are other studies that offer financial rewards for exercise or for attending weight loss programs, 
but Appendix Table 2.1 is limited to studies of financial rewards for weight loss. 
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it monitors employee weight loss and pays the rewards.  After an employer contracts 
with Company X, Company X has a kickoff event in the workplace that explains the 
program to the employees and encourages them to sign up.  Participation is optional.  
Those who sign up select a physical activity regimen at either the foundation (easiest), 
intermediate, or advanced level.  The program consists of several elements: 1) daily 
email coaching that includes information about healthy and effective methods of 
weight loss including decreasing calorie intake and increasing physical activity in a 
manner consistent with the regimen the enrollee chose at baseline; 2) call center 
support; 3) weigh-ins at least once a quarter; and 4) financial incentives for achieving 
specific weight loss targets.  Only employees who are overweight (BMI of at least 
25) are eligible to receive financial rewards, and no financial rewards will be paid 
once an employee’s BMI falls below 25 (i.e. when the employee falls into the “healthy 
weight” category).   
The weigh-ins take place in HIPAA-compliant13 kiosks that company X 
installs in the employer’s workplace.  Employees enter the privacy-protected kiosk 
and stand on a scale; their body mass index is recorded and sent over an internet 
connection to their personal webpage as well as to Company X’s database.  
Participants can weigh themselves as often as they like, and the lowest recorded 
weight will be counted as that quarter’s weight.  Financial rewards are paid based on 
percent of baseline weight lost.14   
Company X has a standard set of incentives that it proposes, but employers can 
                                                 
13
 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulates the disclosure of health 
information. 
14
 We asked Company X whether people game the system by trying to weigh more at baseline (from 
which future weight losses are judged).  They said that through the cameras installed in their kiosks 
they do not see people wearing heavier clothes to the baseline weigh-in than to later weigh-ins; in all 
cases people seem for vanity reasons to remove shoes and sweaters before weighing in.  However, 
Company X acknowledges that they have no way to know if people (e.g.) hid weights in their pockets 
or shoes before the baseline weigh-in.  If people engage in such deception then we would expect to see 
significant drops in weight at the first weigh-in after baseline but we do not find this pattern in the data. 
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modify it.  In our data, there are three incentive schedules.  The first is Company 
X’s standard set of incentives: the employee participants pay no fee (all costs are paid 
by the employer), and employees receive quarterly payments determined by percent of 
baseline weight lost to date.  Table 2.1 lists the standard set of incentives: payment 
thresholds occur at each percentage point of weight loss up to 5% (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), then 
thresholds occur every 5 percentage points (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30) up to 30% of weight 
loss.  The payment associated with these thresholds varies; for the first seven (1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 10, 15) the reward is a dollar per percentage point of weight loss.  Then the per-
percentage-point rewards increase: $25 for losing 20%, $35 for losing 25%, and $50 
for losing 30%.  These are monthly amounts that are paid quarterly, so someone who 
loses 5% of his weight and keeps it off for three months receives a $15 check for the 
quarter ($5 monthly payment x 3 months).  Five employers (with a total of thirteen 
worksites participating) used this standard incentives schedule. 
The second incentive schedule, used by one employer (with two worksites 
participating), is shown in Table 2.2 and includes both a lottery and a deposit contract. 
The lottery takes place each quarter and the prizes are gift certificates (ten $50 gift 
cards and ten $50 salon vouchers); only those who had lost some weight since baseline 
are eligible for the drawing.  The deposit contract is that employees must pay $9.95 
per month (except the first month, which is free), all of which (11 * $9.95 or $109.45) 
is refunded at the end of the year if the respondent loses at least 5% of baseline weight 
by year’s end.  If the respondent loses 10% or more of their baseline weight, they 
receive in addition to their refunded fees ($109.45) a $100 bonus, for a total of 
$229.40.  In addition, the “biggest loser” (as a percent of baseline weight) receives a 
$250 gift certificate at the end of the year.   
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Table 2.1 Financial Rewards Based on Weight Loss “Standard incentives” 
 
Weight Loss  
(as % of Baseline Weight) 
Dollar Reward Per Month 
(Paid Quarterly) 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
10 10 
15 15 
20 25 
25 35 
30 50 
 
Notes: Only participants with BMI over 25 (that is, those who are 
overweight or obese) are eligible to receive incentives.  Moreover, people 
can only get incentives for weight loss down to a BMI of 25 – there is no 
financial incentive for anyone in the healthy weight (18.5 to 25) or 
underweight (<18.5) BMI categories to lose weight. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Financial Rewards Based on Weight Loss “Modified incentives” 
 
Weight Loss  
(as % of Baseline Weight) 
Reward 
(Some Quarterly, Some Annual) 
Greater than zero Entered into quarterly drawing for gift 
certificates: ten $50 gift cards each 
quarter and ten $50 salon vouchers each 
quarter. 
5 Complete reimbursement of monthly 
fees (11 * $9.95 = $109.45), paid at end 
of year 
10 Complete reimbursement of monthly 
fees (11 * $9.95 = $109.45) plus $100 
bonus, paid at end of year 
“Biggest loser” (as % of baseline) 
at worksite 
$250 gift certificate, awarded at end of 
year, plus the appropriate award listed 
above for the specific amount of weight 
loss 
Notes: Only participants with BMI over 25 (that is, those who are overweight or obese) are 
eligible to receive incentives.  Moreover, people can only get incentives for weight loss 
down to a BMI of 25 – there is no financial incentive for anyone in the healthy weight (18.5 
to 25) or underweight (<18.5) BMI categories to lose weight. 
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Whether a participant would receive a higher payoff in the standard or 
modified group depends on both quarter and magnitude of weight loss.  In quarters 
one through three, the standard incentives are more generous than the modified 
incentives at all levels of weight loss, with the exception that those losing between 
0.1% and 0.9% of baseline weight receive no reward in the standard incentives group 
but are eligible for the lottery for gift cards in the modified incentives group.  In 
quarter four, the standard incentives are more generous for weight loss of between 1% 
and 4%, but the modified incentives are more generous for weight loss of 5% or more. 
The third schedule, used by one employer (with a total of two worksites), 
offered no incentives for weight loss, but did include one modest incentive to not 
attrite: participants were promised $20 if they participated for the entire year (i.e. 
weighed in at least once in each of the four quarters).  This group received all of the 
features of the Company X intervention (daily emails, call center access, weigh-ins at 
the kiosk) but were offered no incentives for weight loss, making it useful both as a 
control group for measuring the impact of financial incentives isolated from all the 
other program elements, and for estimating the impact of the Company X treatment 
minus the financial incentives. 
Figure 2.1 presents a flow diagram of attrition and analysis for all three groups 
(standard incentives, modified incentives, control) combined.   
 
Hypotheses 
 Part of our purpose in this paper is exploratory - to measure enrollment, 
attrition and weight loss in these programs.  We focus in particular on attrition and 
weight loss as outcomes because the NIH Technology Assessment Conference Panel  
  
Figure 2.1 Flow Diagram of 
 
(1993) recommends using the percentage of all beginning participants who complete 
the program, and the percentage of those completing the program who achieve various 
degrees of weight loss as measures of program success.  The NIH considers a loss of 
10% of baseline weight in 6 months to one year to be good progress for an obese 
individual (NHLBI 2000).
Another purpose of this paper is to test the following hypotheses.
Hypotheses Regarding Enrollment
There will be lower enrollment in the program that required peopl
post forfeitable bonds.
with price.  The program that requires people to post a forfeitable bond raises the 
expected price of participation, assuming that not all possible participants expect 
100% probability of success (and therefore the return of their bond).  The published 
Intervention established in worksite
Do not participate in program 
(N=11,727)
Drop out during 1st quarter
(N=997)
53 
Attrition and Analysis 
 
 
  The law of demand states that the quantity demanded falls 
Participate in program
(N=2,407)
Weigh in during 1st quarter
(N=1,410)
Drop out during 2nd quarter
(N=250)
Weigh in during 2nd quarter
(N=1,160)
Drop out during 3rd quarter
(N=201)
Weigh in during 3rd quarter
(N=959)
Drop out during 4th quarter
(N=209)
Weigh in during 4th quarter
 
 
e to 
a 
(N=750)
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literature confirms that, all else equal, enrollment in weight loss programs is lower if 
people are asked to post forfeitable bonds (e.g. Jeffery et al. 1978).   
Those who are willing to post a forfeitable bond will be better motivated 
or prepared for weight loss than those not required to post such a bond.   
In other words, we expect differential selection – those unwilling to post a 
forfeitable bond are excluded from the modified incentives group but are not excluded 
from the control group or standard incentives group.  As a result, we expect that the 
modified incentives group will be better prepared or motivated for weight loss than the 
other groups. 
Hypotheses Regarding Attrition 
There will be lower attrition in the program that required employees to 
post bonds that are refundable based on achievement of weight loss goals.  Those 
willing to post a bond are expected to be more motivated or determined to lose weight.   
Selection aside, bonds may also increase retention. 
Those who attrite will have been relatively unsuccessful at weight loss. 
Participants enroll with incomplete information about certain costs and benefits of 
participating.  Those that lose relatively little weight may update their prior beliefs 
and conclude that it is utility maximizing for them to drop out of the intervention.  
This is especially true of those in the modified incentives group, who are charged a 
monthly fee for participation that will not be refunded if year-end weight loss is less 
than 5% of baseline weight.     
Hypotheses Regarding Weight Loss 
Weight loss will be greater for those offered financial rewards for weight 
loss.  Both the standard incentives group and the modified incentives group were 
offered financial rewards for weight loss, whereas the control group were not offered 
any.  In other words, we hypothesize that financial rewards are effective in promoting 
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weight loss. 
In quarter 4 weight loss will be greater in the modified incentives group 
than in the standard incentives group. 
This prediction is based on the magnitudes of the incentives; the modified 
incentives group has much greater incentives for 5% and 10% weight loss by the end 
of quarter 4.  Specifically, the modified incentives group receives a refund of their 
$119.40 bond if at least 5% of weight is lost, with an additional bonus of $100 if 10% 
of weight is lost.  Moreover, those achieving very high weight loss will be in 
competition for the $250 bonus for being the “biggest loser”.  In contrast, the 
standard incentives group is paid $5 per month for losing 5% of starting weight and 
$10 per month for losing 10% of starting weight (triple those amounts for the entire 
quarter).  Relative to the standard incentives, the modified incentives create greater 
incentive for weight loss by the end of quarter four. 
In addition, there are two reasons that the relative performance of the modified 
incentives group by the end of quarter 4 might be better than one would expect based 
on the magnitude of the rewards alone.  First, we expect differential selection - those 
willing to post a bond are likely better prepared or more motivated for weight loss.  
Second, the research literature on loss aversion indicates that people are more 
motivated by a risk of losing their own money (as in the modified incentives group) 
than they are by the prospect of winning someone else’s money (as in the standard 
incentives group).   
In quarters 1 through 3, weight loss will be greater in the standard 
incentives group than in the modified incentives group. 
This prediction is also based on the magnitudes of the incentives.  In quarters 
1 through 3, the standard incentives group is offered $5 per month for 5% weight loss, 
and $10 per month for 10% weight loss (see Table 2.1 for the full schedule of financial 
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rewards).  In contrast, there is no marginal reward for 5% or 10% weight loss in any 
of the first three quarters for the modified incentives group (those losing any weight at 
all are eligible for lottery prizes, but there is no additional reward for any weight loss 
above the trivial amount that makes one eligible for the lottery).  
However, there are three reasons that the relative performance of the modified 
incentives group in quarters one through three might be better than one would expect 
based on the magnitude of the rewards alone.  The first reason is differential 
selection.  The second reason is loss aversion; the fear of losing one’s money at 
year’s end may motivate members of the modified incentives group to lose weight in 
the early quarters, even when there are no quarter-specific rewards for doing so.  
Third, it may take more than one quarter to achieve 5% or 10% weight loss, so in 
order to meet their year-end goals members of the modified incentives group may 
have to lose weight in earlier quarters, even though they have no financial incentives 
for meaningful weight loss in those quarters. 
 
Methods and Data 
A limitation of our data is that they are not the result of a randomized 
controlled trial. They are opportunistic data, provided to us by Company X.  As a 
result, we face two challenges: 1) assignment to the three treatment groups is 
nonrandom: the incentive schedules were chosen by the employers; 2) the 
participation of employees is voluntary; there is selection by employees.   
Regarding problem #1 (selection by employers into different incentive 
schedules), we assume that this is ignorable.  In other words, we assume that 
employer preference for incentive structure is uncorrelated with unobserved employee 
characteristics that affect attrition and weight loss.  Company X told us that the 
reason that one employer requested the modified incentives schedule (with forfeitable 
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bonds) is because the company didn’t want to pay for cash rewards.  This would be 
more problematic if the employer requested the modified schedule because the 
employer thought it would be more effective for their particular employees. 
A related problem is that unobserved employee characteristics may vary 
systematically across the three groups.  Company X designed this intervention for 
office employees who spend their days in front of computers; it is they, for example, 
who are most likely to read the daily emails regarding nutrition and physical activity.  
For the most part, enrollees fit this description.  Table 2.3 lists the industries of the 
employers.  The five employers (with a total of 13 worksites) in the standard 
incentive group include an HMO office, an HMO clinic (in which enrollees are 
nurses), two bank offices, and an insurance company.  The one employer (with a total 
of two worksites) that instituted the modified incentive schedule is an insurance 
company, and the one employer (with a total of two worksites) in the control group is 
a grocery administrative office.  Company X tells us that the nurses (who face the 
standard incentive schedule) have generally been least compliant with the program; 
they speculate that it may be because they do not work in front of computers all day 
and thus derive less benefit from the daily emails and the online tracking of measured 
weight. 
Regarding problem #2 (selection by employees into participation), we consider 
this to be a limitation for generalizing results to the entire population but not a 
problem in the sense that any similar intervention is also likely to be optional, and so 
the findings for a set of volunteers is most relevant.  All of the studies in Appendix 
Table 2.1 are all based on volunteers recruited to participate in a weight loss program, 
and are likewise not a random sample of the general population.   
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Table 2.3  Description of Employers 
 
Employer Description Incentive Schedule 
1 HMO clinic - nurses Standard 
2 Banking office Standard 
3 HMO office Standard 
4 Banking office Standard 
5 Insurance office Standard 
6 Insurance company Modified 
7 Grocery administrative office Control  
An additional problem when studying weight loss is that there is attrition from 
the program.  Weight-loss interventions in general (even those without financial 
rewards) typically have substantial attrition (Ware 2003; Gadbury et al. 2003).  There 
are several strategies for handling the attrition when evaluating interventions.  The 
definitive is the intent-to-treat analysis, which includes all patients in their groups, 
regardless of whether they received the treatment, deviated from the protocol or 
withdrew (Ware 2003).  However, to implement this one must have follow-up data 
on all of the dropouts, which is not available in this case.  Another option is to 
conduct a “completers” analysis, which examines data only for those who completed 
the study.  This is likely to be biased toward showing an impact of the treatment, as 
those most likely to quit are probably those for whom the intervention was least 
effective (Ware 2003).  Another option is last-observation-carried-forward, which 
assumes that the dropouts remained at their last measured weight.  This also likely 
results in upward bias in estimates of program effectiveness, as weight regain is 
common (Ware 2003; Serdula et al. 1999).  Another option is baseline-carried-
forward, which assumes that after attriting the subjects return to their baseline weight.  
This may cause downward bias in the estimate of efficacy, as weight regain may be 
incomplete or slow.  We present findings for completers analysis, last-observation-
carried-forward, and baseline-carried-forward.   
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The total number of employees in the dataset is 2,407: 1,513 facing the 
standard incentives, 765 facing the modified incentives, and 129 in the control group 
with no financial incentives.  The data cover 2004-2008.  We drop from the sample 
participants with baseline BMI below 25 because they were not eligible for financial 
rewards.  Thirteen participants in the control group were dropped because they were 
simultaneously participating in another workplace weight-loss intervention. 
We estimate attrition rates by quarter and group.  We graph the distribution of 
weight loss by group and quarter, both for a completers analysis (ignoring dropouts), 
assuming that dropouts stayed at their last measured weight (last observation carried 
forward) and assuming that dropouts return to baseline (baseline carried forward).  
We also calculate the unconditional mean loss in pounds and percent of baseline 
weight lost by group and quarter, for a completers analysis, last observation carried 
forward, and baseline carried forward.   
 
Empirical Results 
Descriptive statistics:  
Table 2.4 presents the summary statistics for participants by group.  Our 
overall sample (N=2,407) consists of 1,513 participants in the standard incentives 
group, 765 participants in the modified incentives group, and 129 participants in the 
control group. 
In each of these groups, men are a minority: 15.7% of the standard incentives 
group, 21.2% of the modified incentives group, and 35.7% of the control group.  The 
average age of participants ranges from 43.0 to 46.2 across groups, and average 
baseline BMI ranges between 31.3 and 32.8 across groups.  In each group there is a 
strikingly high prevalence of morbid obesity (BMI of greater than or equal to 40). In 
the U.S. as a whole, the morbidly obese constitute 4.8% of the population and 7.3% of 
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all overweight Americans (Ogden et al. 2006). In contrast, the morbidly obese 
constitute 28.7% of the standard incentives group, 30.5% of the modified incentives 
group, and 22.5% of the control group. 
Enrollment 
We hypothesized that: There will be lower enrollment in the program that 
required people to post forfeitable bonds.  Table 2.5 lists the percent of the 
workforce that enrolled in the program, by incentive schedule.  Ideally we would 
know the number of employees with BMI of 25 or higher, because only they are 
eligible for financial rewards for weight loss.  Instead, for the denominator we know 
only the total number of employees (i.e. those of all BMI).  As a result, these are 
likely to be underestimates of the percentage of those eligible for financial rewards 
who enrolled in the program.  Percent enrollment was 18.6% for the modified 
incentives (which required a bond), 24.8% for the standard incentives, and 20.3% for 
the program that offered no financial rewards for weight loss but all of the other 
program elements (i.e. the control group).  The point estimates of enrollment are 
consistent with our prediction that the requirement of a bond would result in lower 
enrollment, but the differences are not statistically significant. 
We also hypothesized that: Those who are willing to post a forfeitable bond 
will be better motivated or prepared for weight loss than those not required to 
post such a bond.  There are two variables that can give us information about the 
degree of such differences in selection. The first variable is the level of exercise 
regimen that the employee chose at the beginning of the program.  If those willing to 
pay the monthly fees in the modified incentives group are more motivated or prepared 
to lose weight, one should find that they are less likely to choose the easiest exercise 
regimen.  This is confirmed by the data.  Table 2.4 indicates that the easiest exercise 
regimen (called Foundation) was chosen by 60.1% of the standard incentives group 
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but only 55.0% of the modified incentives group, a difference significant at the 1% 
level.  We also expected that the control group, offered $20 if they participated for 
the full year, would be less motivated on average and therefore more likely to choose 
the easiest exercise regimen than those in the modified incentives group, but we do not 
find this – an even lower percentage of the control group than the modified incentives 
group (48.8% versus 60.1%) chose the easiest exercise regimen, but the difference is 
not statistically significant.     
The second variable that sheds light on difference in selectivity is the 
percentage of the program emails that enrollees read.  If those willing to pay the 
monthly fees in the modified incentives group are more motivated or prepared to lose 
weight, one should find that they read a higher percentage of the program emails.  
That prediction is confirmed by the data – Table 2.4 indicates that the average 
percentage of emails read was 51.0% for members of the modified incentives group 
compared to 45.7% for members of the standard incentives group, a difference 
significant at the 1% level.  (A caveat is that this variable is missing for 51.1% of the 
standard incentives group – it simply wasn’t recorded for certain employers in certain 
years.)   
The control group, being paid to participate, had the lowest email open rate of 
28.7%, which is significantly different from both other groups at the 1% level.  It is 
interesting that the control group had the lowest percentage choosing the easiest 
exercise regimen (which suggests more motivation or better preparation) but the 
lowest email open rate (which suggests lower commitment). 
Overall, the patterns of both exercise regimen and email opening suggest that 
the group required to post a bond (i.e. the modified incentives group) was selected to 
be better prepared and more serious about weight loss than the standard incentives 
group, and therefore should be less likely to attrite and more likely to lose weight. 
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Table 2.4 Summary Statistics by Group 
 
 Standard Incentives Modified Incentives Control Group 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Obs Mean Std. Dev Obs Mean Std. Dev 
Initial BMI 1513 32.8 6.24 765 32.8 6.00 129 31.3 5.72 
Male 1513 0.157 0.364 765 0.212 0.409 129 0.357 0.481 
Age 1513 46.2 10.4 765 43.0 8.8 129 44.4 10.6 
Height 1513 65.5 3.41 765 66.1 3.42 129 66.7 4.25 
Overweight (30>BMI>=25) 1513 0.412 0.492 765 0.382 0.486 129 0.519 0.502 
Obese (40>BMI>=30) 1513 0.301 0.459 765 0.314 0.464 129 0.256 0.438 
Morbidly Obese (BMI>=40) 1513 0.287 0.452 765 0.305 0.461 129 0.225 0.419 
Foundation exercise regimen 1513 0.601 0.490 765 0.550 0.498 129 0.488 0.502 
Intermediate exercise regimen 1513 0.337 0.473 765 0.374 0.484 129 0.426 0.496 
Advanced exercise regimen 1513 0.062 0.241 765 0.076 0.265 129 0.085 0.280 
Email open rate 740 45.7 36.41 765 51.0 35.09 129 28.7 32.47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.5 Enrollment Rates  
 Control  Standard Incentive  Modified Incentive     
 Group Group Group p-value  p-value  p-value  
 (1) (2) (3) (1) equals (2) (1) equals (3) (2) equals (3) 
Mean 0.203 0.248 0.186 0.613 0.839 0.477 
(Std. Dev.) (0.100) (0.115) (0.024)    
Note: Enrollment rates are calculated by the fraction of those who enroll in the program by the total population of the work place. Individuals 
with BMI<25 may enroll in the program, but receive no payouts.  
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Attrition 
Table 2.6 lists the cumulative percentages dropping out, by quarter, for each 
group. In the standard incentives group, 51.2% of baseline participants have dropped  
 
Table 2.6 Cumulative Attrition, by Group and Quarter 
 
Quarter Standard 
Incentives 
Modified 
Incentives 
Control 
Group 
1 51.2%* t  24.8% 25.6% 
2 62.1%* t  33.5% 39.5% 
3 72.0%* t  39.3% 45.0% 
4 76.4%* t  57.4%* 48.1% 
* represents significant difference with the control group at the 5% level 
t represents significant difference between standard and modified incentive 
groups at the 5% level 
 
out by the end of quarter 1, and cumulative attrition rises in the three subsequent 
quarters to 62.1%, 72.0% and 76.4%.  In the modified incentives group, attrition is 
lower: 24.8% after one quarter, rising in the three subsequent quarters to 33.5%, 
39.3%, and 57.4%.  Even in the control group, where participants are promised $20 if 
they weigh in every quarter for a year, attrition is substantial: 25.6% after one quarter, 
rising in the three subsequent quarters to 39.5%, 45.0%, and 48.1%.  When 
considering the levels of attrition, one should keep in mind that enrollees were already 
a select sample.  Participation was optional, and most employees declined to enroll.   
Attrition is typically substantial in weight loss interventions of all kinds (Ware 
2003; Gadbury et al. 2003).  However, the attrition in these groups is particularly 
high.  For example, a recent review (Paul-Ebhohimhen and Avenuell, 2007) of RCTs 
involving financial rewards for weight loss found that the maximum attrition in any 
such study was 57.9% at 13 months, far below what the standard incentives group 
experienced in 12 months (76.4%) but roughly equal to what the modified incentives 
group experienced at 12 months (57.4%).  This suggests that real-world interventions 
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may experience far higher rates of attrition than those overseen by researchers (who 
for the purposes of data quality undertake extensive efforts to keep enrollees from 
attriting), which raises questions about how well the results of pilot studies such as 
those in Appendix Table 2.1 can be duplicated on a larger scale.   
We hypothesized that There will be lower attrition in the program that 
required employees to post bonds that are refundable based on achievement of 
weight loss goals.  The data are consistent with this hypothesis; in every quarter, 
attrition is significantly lower in the modified than the standard incentives group. For 
example, after quarter 1 attrition in the modified incentives group is only half that in 
the standard incentives group (24.8% versus 51.2%).  It impossible to tell from our 
data whether the difference in attrition is due to selection or loss aversion.  Selection 
was evident in the earlier finding that those in the modified incentives group were 
more likely to choose an advanced physical activity regimen and tend to open more 
program emails; before entering the program they may have been better prepared and 
more motivated to lose weight.  On the other hand, those in the modified incentives 
group have “skin in the game” in the form of their deposits, and loss aversion may 
motivate them to stay in the program.   
We also hypothesized that: Those who attrite will have been relatively 
unsuccessful at weight loss.  Table 2.7 lists the weight loss by quarter, categorized 
by whether the participant dropped out in the following quarter or persisted in the 
program through the following quarter.  The table is divided vertically into four 
panels: full sample, standard incentives group, modified incentives group, control 
group.  Among the full sample, those who drop out in the subsequent quarter have 
significantly lower average weight loss than those who persist through the next 
quarter, in quarters 1, 2, and 3.  In each case the difference in mean weight loss to 
date is statistically significant at better than the 1% level.  When we divide the 
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sample by incentive schedule, the same pattern exists for those in the modified 
incentives group: in each of the first three quarters, weight loss to date is significantly 
lower among those who drop out in the following quarter than those who persist 
through the following quarter.  Note that those in the modified incentives group have 
the greatest incentive to drop out if they are not making progress, because to persist 
would require paying monthly fees that one is unlikely to have refunded.  The pattern 
is weaker for the standard incentives group; in quarter 2 future dropouts have 
significantly lower weight loss than those who persist through the next quarter, but the 
difference is not statistically significant.  In quarter 1 and in quarter 3 the sign is in 
the opposite direction and the difference is not statistically significant.  For the 
control group, in no quarter do future dropouts have significantly lower weight loss to 
date than those who will persist in the program. 
 
Weight Loss 
The distribution of percent weight loss, by quarter, is shown in Figures 2 (for 
the standard incentives group), Figures 3 (for the modified incentives group), and 
Figures 4 (for the control group).  The horizontal axis shows the percent of baseline 
weight lost (rounded down to the nearest percentage point15) as of that quarter, and the 
vertical axis indicates the percentage of that sample.  For each group, there is a 
separate page devoted to the data for each quarter.  On each page are three graphs: 
the top graph is the distribution of weight loss in a completers analysis that ignores 
dropouts, the middle graph is from a last observation carried forward analysis in which 
dropouts are assumed to have stayed at their last measured weight, and the bottom  
  
                                                 
15
 We round down so that everyone indicated as having a specific percent weight loss received exactly 
the reward associated with that percent weight loss.  If we rounded to the nearest percentage point, a 
participant who lost 4.6% of her starting weight would be rounded to 5% even though she would not 
have qualified for the financial reward associated with achieving 5% weight loss. 
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Table 2.7 Weight Loss by Future Attrition Status 
 
Full Sample    
Quarter Persist in next quarter Dropout next quarter ttest p-value 
1 4.67 3.49 0.004 
 (2.3%) (1.8%)  
2 5.73 3.33 0.000 
 (2.8%) (1.7%)  
3 6.38 4.23 0.008 
 (3.1%) (2.0%)  
    
Standard Incentive Group   
Quarter Persist in next quarter Dropout next quarter ttest p-value 
1 4.90 4.07 0.122 
 (2.5%) (2.1%)  
2 6.67 3.99 0.003 
 (3.2%) (2.0%)  
3 6.93 8.96 0.128 
 (3.2%) (4.3%)  
    
Modified Incentive Group   
Quarter Persist in next quarter Dropout next quarter ttest p-value 
1 4.66 1.03 0.000 
 (2.3%) (0.6%)  
2 5.36 0.76 0.001 
 (2.6%) (0.3%)  
3 6.77 -1.91 0.000 
 (3.4%) (-1.0%)  
    
Control Group    
Quarter Persist in next quarter Dropout next quarter ttest p-value 
1 3.42 3.54 0.929 
 (1.8%) (1.5%)  
2 3.46 1.36 0.325 
 (1.9%) (0.6%)  
3 1.82 7.99 0.041 
  (0.9%) (4.0%)   
   Weight loss in pounds (Percent weight loss in parenthesis)  
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graph is the distribution of weight loss in a baseline-carried-forward analysis that 
assumes that every dropout returned to their baseline weight.  For any given page, a 
comparison of the top, middle, and bottom graphs confirms that how attrition is 
handled has a substantial impact on estimated weight loss. In the top graphs (the 
completers analysis), the distribution of outcomes seems more favorable (although the 
modal outcome is usually zero weight loss), but in the middle and bottom graphs that 
include information on dropouts, by far the most common outcome is that respondents 
lost zero weight (largely driven by the assumption of setting dropouts at baseline 
weight). 
Each of the graphs in Figure 3-4 indicate that more people in the modified 
incentives group are just over the thresholds of 5% weight loss (at which participants 
are refunded their year’s worth of fees, or $109.46) and 10% weight loss (at which 
they also receive a $100 bonus), then just under the thresholds.  This is less apparent  
in quarters 1-3 (Figures 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3), when there were no financial rewards tied 
to those thresholds for the modified incentives group.  Moreover, such heaping is not 
apparent in the distribution associated with the standard incentive schedule, which has 
more continuous reward thresholds.  This suggests that people may be pushing to 
achieve the substantial payoffs associated with losing 5% or 10% of baseline weight. 
We next discuss the evidence regarding our hypotheses regarding weight loss. 
Weight loss will be greater for those offered financial rewards for weight 
loss.  We test for differences in unconditional means of weight loss in pounds and 
percent of baseline weight by quarter and group.  We then test for differences in 
unconditional probability of losing 5% and 10% of baseline body weight.  Note that 
the differences between the treatment groups and the control group can be interpreted 
as the effect of the financial incentives, distinct from all of the other program elements 
(e.g. daily emails and call center support) shared by the control group.  
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Figure 2.2-1 Distribution of Percent Weight Loss under Standard incentives 
Quarter 1  
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Figure 2.2-2 Distribution of Percent Weight Loss under Standard incentives 
Quarter 2 
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Figure 2.2-3 Distribution of Percent Weight Loss under Standard incentives 
Quarter 3 
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Figure 2.2-4 Distribution of Percent Weight Loss under Standard incentives 
Quarter 4 
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Figure 2.3-1 Distribution of Percent Weight Loss under Modified incentives 
Quarter 1 
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Figure 2.3-2 Distribution of Percent Weight Loss under Modified incentives 
Quarter 2 
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Figure 2.3-3 Distribution of Percent Weight Loss under Modified incentives 
Quarter 3 
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Figure 2.3-4 Distribution of Percent Weight Loss under Modified incentives 
Quarter 4 
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Figure 2.4-1 Distribution of Percent Weight Loss in the Control Group 
Quarter 1 
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Figure 2.4-2 Distribution of Percent Weight Loss in the Control Group 
Quarter 2 
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Figure 2.4-3 Distribution of Percent Weight Loss in the Control Group 
Quarter 3 
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Figure 2.4-4 Distribution of Percent Weight Loss in the Control Group 
Quarter 4 
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Table 2.8 lists weight loss in pounds and percent of baseline weight, by group 
and quarter.  The cells also list the minimum and maximum weight loss (a negative 
minimum weight loss indicates weight gain) for that group in that quarter (the 
minimum and maximum are not affected by how dropouts are treated, so they are 
entered in only the leftmost column for each group).  Because so many participants 
drop out, and attrition is correlated with weight loss success, estimates of average 
weight loss are extremely sensitive to how attrition is handled.  We focus here on the 
baseline carried forward analysis, which assumes that everyone who dropped out went 
back to their baseline weight.  
In the baseline carried forward analysis, average weight loss in the control 
group is 2.6 pounds (1.29%) in the first quarter, 1.9 pounds (0.98%) in the second 
quarter, 1.7 pounds (0.82%) in the third quarter, and 1.7 pounds (0.87%) in the fourth 
quarter.  These can be interpreted as the unconditional average effect of the program 
elements other than financial rewards (e.g. emails, call center access, and weigh-ins), 
because in a previous randomized experiment, a control group that received no 
treatment of any kind experienced virtually no change in average weight after 6 or 12 
months (Jeffery, Wing, et al., 1993).  This suggests that changes in weight observed 
in the control group measure the effect of all elements of Company X treatment except 
financial rewards.   
In the standard incentives group, average weight loss is 2.2 pounds (1.13%) in 
the first quarter, 2.1 pounds (1.04%) in the second quarter, 2.2 pounds (1.03%) in the 
third quarter, and 1.4 pounds (0.64%) in the fourth quarter.  We fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the control and standard incentives group; in fact, 
average weight loss is consistently lower in the standard incentives group than in the 
control group.  Despite the small average weight loss in the standard incentives 
group, there are some substantial success stories; the maximum weight lost since 
 82 
 
baseline is 58.8 lbs. in quarter 1, 89.4 lbs. in quarter 2, 109.2 lbs. in quarter 3, and 
116.8 lbs. in quarter 4.  For any given mean, success stories are balanced by failures; 
for example, the maximum weight gain is 12.6 lbs. in quarter 1, 19.8 lbs. in quarter 2, 
25 lbs. in quarter 3, and 25.6 lbs. in quarter 4. 
Weight loss in the modified incentives group averages 3.2 pounds (1.55%) in 
the first quarter, 3.3 pounds (1.58%) in the second quarter, 2.5 pounds (1.21%) in the 
third quarter, and 3.6 pounds (1.77%) in the fourth quarter.  In quarter four (but not 
earlier quarters) the difference between the modified incentives group and the control 
group in average weight loss is statistically significant. 
We also measure weight loss by success in reaching certain benchmarks.  
Table 2.9 lists the percent of participants losing 5% of baseline weight, by group and 
quarter, for completers, last observation carried forward, and baseline carried forward 
analyses.  In the baseline carried forward analysis, the percentage of the control 
group that lost 5% of their baseline weight, by quarter, was: 9.3%, 7.8%, 13.2%, and 
10.1%.   
Relative to the control group, it is generally the case that smaller percentages 
of the standard incentives group achieved 5% weight loss in each quarter (8.3%, 8.2%, 
7.9%, and 5.4%); the difference is statistically significant in quarters 3 and 4. 
Relative to the control group, higher percentages of the modified incentives 
group achieved 5% weight loss in each quarter (12.6%, 16.5%, 14.0%, 19.5%); the 
differences are statistically significant in quarters 2 and 4. 
We also examine the probabilities of losing 10% of baseline weight, the 
outcome that the NIH (1990) recommends for evaluating weight loss programs.  
Table 2.10 lists the unconditional probabilities of losing 10% of baseline weight by 
group and quarter, for completers, last observation carried forward, and baseline 
carried forward  
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analyses.  Assuming that dropouts returned to their baseline weight, the percentage of 
the control group that lost 10% of baseline weight, by quarter, was 0.0%, 2.3%, 2.3%, 
and 3.1%.  These are comparable to the corresponding percentages for the standard 
incentives group (1.2%, 2.0%, 2.9%, and 2.4%); the differences are not statistically 
significant.  Relative to the control group, higher percentages of the modified 
incentives group achieved 10% weight loss in each quarter (2.1%, 4.3%, 3.8%, and 
6.5%) but the differences are not statistically significant. 
We hypothesized that: In quarter 4 weight loss will be greater in the 
modified incentives group than in the standard incentives group.  This is true for 
the unconditional means in Table 2.8.  Assuming dropouts return to their baseline 
weight (baseline carried forward), average year-end weight loss is 3.6 pounds (1.77%) 
in the modified incentives group compared to 1.4 pounds (0.64%) in the standard 
incentives group, a difference significant at the 1% level.  Table 2.9 indicates that at 
the end of quarter 4, 19.5% of the modified incentives group had lost 5% or more of 
their baseline weight, compared to only 5.4% of the standard incentives group, a 
difference significant at the 1% level.  Table 2.10 shows that the percent losing 10% 
or more of baseline weight was 6.5% in the modified incentives group and only 2.4% 
in the standard incentives group, a difference significant at the 1% level.   
In quarters 1 through 3, weight loss will be greater in the standard 
incentives group than in the modified incentives group. 
Contrary to our prediction, weight loss is greater in the modified incentives 
group than in the standard incentives group in quarters one through three.  Table 2.8 
shows that those in the modified incentives group lost an average of 3.2, 3.3, and 2.5 
pounds in the first three quarters, compared to the standard incentives group average 
losses of 2.2, 2.1, and 2.2 pounds.  This difference is statistically significant at the 
1% level in quarters one and two.  Table 2.9 shows that in each case a higher 
  
 
Table 2.8 Weight Loss in Pounds and Percent of Baseline Weight, by Group and Quarter 
    Standard   Modified Control 
    Incentives   Incentives Group 
Quarter Ignoring 
Dropouts 
Last 
Weight 
Carry-
Forward 
Baseline 
Carry-
Forward 
Ignoring 
Dropouts 
Last 
Weight 
Carry-
Forward 
Baseline 
Carry-
Forward 
Ignoring 
Dropouts 
Last 
Weight 
Carry-
Forward 
Baseline 
Carry-
Forward 
1 4.6 2.2 t  2.2 t  4.2 3.2 3.2 3.4 2.6 2.6 
(2.31%) (1.13%) (1.13) (2.06%) (1.55%) (1.55%) (1.73%) (1.29%) (1.29%) 
Min = -12.6     Min = -11.6     Min = -6.0     
Max = 58.8     Max = 34.6     Max = 19.6     
2 5.5* t  2.7 2.1 t  4.9 3.3 3.3 3.1 2.4 1.9 
(2.73%) (1.34%) (1.04%) (2.38%) (1.64%) (1.58%) (1.62%) (1.21%) (0.98%) 
Min = -19.8     Min = -18.4     Min = -8.8     
Max = 89.4     Max = 52.8     Max = 30.2     
3 7.77* t  3.2 2.2 4.1 2.6 2.5 3.0 2.2 1.7 
(3.68%) (1.54%) (1.03%) (2.00%) (1.27%) (1.21%) (1.49%) (1.06%) (0.82%) 
Min = -25.4     Min = -29.8     Min = -22.2     
Max = 109.2     Max = 53.6     Max = 32     
4 6.1 t  3.2 1.4 t  8.4* 3.3 3.6* 3.2 2.9 1.7 
(2.75%) (1.52%) (0.64%) (4.15%) (1.61%) (1.77%) (1.68%) (1.47%) (0.87%) 
Min = -25.6     Min = -30.6     Min = -13.8     
Max = 116.8     Max = 61.2     Max = 30.8     
Note: A positive number indicates weight lost.  A negative number (e.g. for the minimum weight loss) indicates weight gain.  
* represents significant difference with the control group at the 5% level 
t represents significant difference between standard and modified incentive groups at the 5% level 
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Table 2.9 Percent of Respondents Losing 5% of Baseline Weight, by Group and Quarter 
 
  Standard Modified Control 
  Incentives Incentives Group 
Quarter Ignoring 
Dropouts 
Last 
Weight 
Carry-
Forward 
Baseline 
Carry-
Forward 
Ignoring 
Dropouts 
Last 
Weight 
Carry-
Forward 
Baseline 
Carry-
Forward 
Ignoring 
Dropout
s 
Last 
Weight 
Carry-
Forward 
Baseline 
Carry-
Forward 
1 17.1% 8.3% t  8.3% t  16.7% 12.6% 12.6% 12.5% 9.3% 9.3% 
2 21.6% 10.8% t  8.2% t  24.8%* 16.9% 16.5%* 12.8% 10.1% 7.8% 
3 28.1% 13.0% 7.9%* t  23.1% 15.0% 14.0% 23.9% 15.5% 13.2% 
4 22.7% t  13.3% t  5.4%* t  45.7%* 20.9% 19.5%* 19.4% 17.8% 10.1% 
* represents significant difference with the control group at the 5% level 
t represents significant difference between standard and modified incentive groups at the 5% level 
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Table 2.10 Percent of Respondents Losing 10% of Baseline Weight, by Group and Quarter 
 
  Standard Modified Control 
  Incentives Incentives Group 
Quarter Ignoring 
Dropouts 
Last 
Weight 
Carry-
Forward 
Baseline 
Carry-
Forward 
Ignoring 
Dropouts 
Last 
Weight 
Carry-
Forward 
Baseline 
Carry-
Forward 
Ignoring 
Dropouts 
Last 
Weight 
Carry-
Forward 
Baseline 
Carry-
Forward 
1 2.4% 1.2% 1.2% 2.8% 2.1% 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2 5.2% 2.2% t  2.0% t  6.5% 4.3% 4.3% 3.8% 2.3% 2.3% 
3 10.4% t  3.8% 2.9% 6.3% 4.1% 3.8% 4.2% 2.3% 2.3% 
4 10.1% t  4.4% t  2.4% t  15.3%* 6.8% 6.5% 6.0% 4.7% 3.1% 
* represents significant difference with the control group at the 5% level 
t represents significant difference between standard and modified incentive groups at the 5% level 
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proportion of the modified incentives group than the standard incentives group 
achieved 5% weight loss: 12.6% versus 8.3% in quarter one, 16.5% versus 8.2% in 
quarter two, and 14.0% versus 7.9% in quarter three; in each case these differences are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Table 2.10 shows that the probability of losing 
10% or more of baseline weight is consistently higher in the modified incentives group 
than the standard incentives group, and the difference is statistically significant in 
quarter 2.   
These results suggest that the effect of greater financial incentives for the 
standard incentives group is swamped by some combination of more favorable 
selection into the modified incentives group, loss aversion, and the necessity of 
starting early to achieve 5% or 10% weight loss by the end of quarter four. 
 
Discussion 
A 2007 Institute of Medicine report on preventing obesity set the immediate 
next step – which it described as an essential priority action for the near future – as 
“learning what works and what does not work and broadly sharing that information.” 
(IOM 2007, p. 410).  It also notes that “All types of evaluation can make an 
important contribution to the evidence base upon which to design policies, programs, 
and interventions.” (Ibid, p. 4).  This paper makes a contribution to that effort by 
documenting attrition and weight loss in a large program that offers financial 
incentives for weight loss. 
The program studied is of particular interest because it is a real-world 
intervention, not a pilot program designed and monitored by researchers.  As a result, 
the data are informative about how such interventions work in the real-world.  
However, because it is a real-world intervention, it suffers the limitations of selection 
by employers of incentive schedule, and a relatively small control group (129 out of a 
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total sample of 2,407). 
We study the two outcomes recommended by the NIH for evaluating weight 
loss interventions: attrition and weight loss.  We find higher attrition (up to 76.4% 
after one year) than virtually all previous studies (see Appendix Table 2.1 and Paul-
Ebhohimhen and Avenell, 2007).  Another recent study of real-world wagers on own 
weight loss also found 80% failure (Burger and Lynham, 2008).   
We find that the financial rewards in this program are associated with modest 
changes in weight.  After one year, those in the modified incentives group lose 1.9 
pounds more than those in the control group, while the weight loss of those in the 
standard incentives group is not statistically distinguishable from that of the control 
group.  The NIH considers a loss of 10% of baseline weight in 6 months to one year 
to be good progress for an obese individual (NHLBI 2000).  By this standard, very 
few participants in this program achieve good progress toward weight loss: just 2.4% 
of the standard incentives group and 6.5% of the modified incentives group lost 10% 
of their starting weight in 12 months.  By most measures, participants in the modified 
incentives group had 12-month weight loss that was greater than those in the standard 
incentives group, but it is not clear how much of this is due to selection and how much 
is due to bonds, controlling for selection.   
The weight loss associated with the program we examine is generally smaller 
than that documented in the previous literature.  For example, Volpp et al. (2008) 
estimate mean 16-week weight loss to be 13.1 lbs. when rewards take the form of a 
lottery with a daily expected value of $3, and 14.0 lbs. when the rewards take the form 
of deposit contracts or bonds, whose amount is chosen by the enrollee but can vary 
between $0 and $3 per day and is matched 1:1 if the weight loss goal is achieved.   
Our findings are closer to those of Finkelstein et al. (2007), who find modest 
weight loss (between 2.0 and 4.7 lbs.) at three months, but no significant weight loss at 
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six months, associated with financial rewards that varied between $7 and $14 per 
percentage point of weight lost after six months.  Likewise, Butsch et al. (2007) find 
no significant difference in 12-week weight loss between a treatment group offered a 
$150 refund of their enrollment fee if they lost 6% of their initial weight, and a control 
group which was not eligible for such a refund. 
Overall, our findings regarding attrition and weight loss suggest that the 
experience of pilot programs (such as those described in Appendix Table 2.1) may be 
overoptimistic about what can be achieved on a larger scale. 
To put our findings in a the broader context of what works to promote weight 
loss, a literature review (Douketis et al. 2005) found that dietary and lifestyle therapy 
tends to result in less than 5 kg weight loss after 2-4 years, pharmacologic therapy 
results in 5-10 kg weight loss after 1-2 years, and surgical therapy results in 25-75 kg 
weight loss after 2-4 years.  At this point, financial rewards remain a promising 
method for weight loss but it remains to be seen whether they can be as effective as 
traditional medical approaches.   
This paper presents the basic patterns in the data.  Our follow-up work will 
estimate hazard models of attrition and estimate regression models of weight loss to 
measure the change in weight associated with the incentive schedules, controlling for 
the observable characteristics of participants.  Future research in this area should also 
focus on the optimal design of financial incentives for maximizing loss of excess 
weight, finding ways to decrease attrition, whether offering extrinsic rewards 
decreases intrinsic motivation, and whether weight loss is maintained after financial 
incentives for weight loss are removed. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Table 2.1: Previous Literature on Financial Incentives for Weight Loss 
 
Study Study Design Intervention and Incentives Sample Size and 
Population 
Duration Weight Loss Attrition 
Volpp et al. 
(2008) 
Randomized 
controlled trial 
3 groups:  
 
Deposits contract of $0-$3 / day 
matched 1:1. 
 
Lottery for daily prize with E[V]=$3. 
 
Self-reported daily weight. 
 
$20 for monthly weigh- in, 
unconditionally 
N=57 (19 in each of 3 
groups) 
 
Patients at 
Philadelphia Veterans 
Affairs Medical Center 
with BMI 30-40 
16 weeks Mean weight loss:  
Lottery: 13.1 lbs 
 
Deposit contracts: 14.0 
 
Control: 3.9 lbs. 
8.8% 
Burger and 
Lynham 
(2008) 
working 
paper 
Opportunistic data 
from William Hill 
betting agency for 
1993-2006 
Maximum bet of $65.  William Hill 
offered odds ranging from 5:1 to 50:1; 
potential payoff averaged $1,926. 
 
Average duration of bet is 8 months, 
weight to be lost ranges from 28-168 
lbs. 
 
Each bettor weighed at start and end of 
bet by physician. 
 
No control group. 
N=51 
 
Self-selected members 
of British population. 
Average of 8 
months 
Approximately 80% of 
people betting on their 
weight loss lose the 
bet 
Approximate
ly 80% of 
people 
betting on 
their weight 
loss lose the 
bet 
Finkelstein 
et al. (2007) 
Randomized trial, 
no control group 
Three groups:  
Back loaded: $0 at 3 months, $14 per 
% point lost at 6 months 
 
Front loaded: $14 per % point lost at 3 
N=207 (72 in Back 
Loaded, 64 in Front 
Loaded, 71 in Steady 
Payment) 
 
6 months Mean weight loss 3 
months: 
2 lbs for Back Loaded, 
4.7 lbs for Front 
Loaded, 3 lbs for 
54% in Back 
Loaded, 45% 
in Front 
Loaded, 31% 
in Steady 
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months, $0 at 6 months 
 
Steady payment: $7 per % point lost at 
both 3 months and 6 months 
 
Weigh-ins at 3 months and 6 months. 
 
Incentives only up to 10% weight loss 
($140) 
Overweight and obese 
employees at one 
university and 3 
community colleges in 
NC 
Steady Payment 
 
Mean weight loss at 6 
months not 
significantly different 
from zero 
 
Payment 
Butsch et al. 
(2007) 
Sequential 
control-
intervention, not 
randomized 
Treatment group eligible for 50% 
reimbursement of enrollment fee ($150 
of $300) if lose 6% of initial weight 
and attend 10 of 12 group sessions 
 
Control group was not eligible for 
reimbursement 
N=401 (241 
intervention of which 
59 enrolled, 160 
control of which 40 
enrolled) 
 
Participants in Univ. 
Alabama at 
Birmingham EatRight 
Lifestyle Program 
 
BMI 30 and over. 
12 weeks Mean weight loss: 
2.25%  in control 
group, 3.27% in 
intervention group; 
difference not 
statistically significant 
Not stated 
Hubbert et 
al. (2003) 
Propensity score 
matching of 4 
controls to each 
member of 
intervention group 
Treatment group eligible for 50% of 
cost of program fees ($150 of $300) if 
lose 6% of initial weight and attend 10 
of 12 group sessions. 
 
Control group was not eligible for 
reimbursement 
N=125:  
25 in intervention 
group, 100 in control 
group 
 
Participants in Univ. 
Alabama at 
Birmingham EatRight 
Lifestyle Program and 
members of UAB-
owned HMO 
 
BMI 30 and over. 
12 weeks Mean weight loss: 7.3 
kg (6.1%) in 
intervention group, 4.0 
kg (3.9%) in control 
group; both 
differences are 
statistically significant 
Not stated 
Jeffery, 
Forster, et 
Block-
randomized 
Worksites divided evenly between 
treatment and control groups. 
32 worksites in 
Minneapolis / St. Paul 
2 years No treatment effect 
was found for weight. 
No attrition 
of worksites.  
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al. (1993) controlled 
experiment 
(worksites 
randomized) 
 
Treatment (Healthy Worker Project) 
consisted of health education classes 
and payroll deductions that served as 
bonds – refunded if achieve weight loss 
goals or donated to charity otherwise. 
 
Goals chosen by employee and ranged 
from minimum of 0 lb and maximum 
of 1% body weight loss each week.   
 
Participants chose amount of payroll 
deduction (minimum of $5 biweekly). 
 
200 employees surveyed at baseline 
and again after 2 years (cohort). 
Another 200 employees surveyed after 
2 years (cross-section).  
 
Weight self-reported but corrected for 
reporting error. 
metropolitan area.   
 
Of 10,000 employees 
in treatment worksites, 
2,041 employees 
participated in weight 
control program. 
 
 
 
In cohort survey, 
average change in 
BMI was 0.08 units for 
control group, -0.02 
units for treatment 
group; not statistically 
significant. 
 
In cross-sectional 
survey, average 
change in BMI was -
0.05 in both the 
treatment and control 
groups. 
Jeffery, 
Wing, et al. 
(1993) 
Randomized 
controlled 
experiment 
Five groups: 1) control; 2) standard 
behavioral therapy (SBT); 3) SBT plus 
food provision; 4) SBT plus incentives; 
5) SBT plus food provision plus 
incentives. 
 
Weekly incentives: $0 if gained weight, 
$2.50 if did not gain weight; $12.50 if 
weight loss was 50% of goal, $25 if 
weight loss reached goal. 
 
Weight-loss goals could be either 14, 
18, or 23 kg during course of program. 
 
Weight measured at baseline, 6, 12, 
N=202 men and 
women from 
Pittsburgh and 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, 
of which 40 to 41 were 
in each of the 5 
groups. 
 
Had to be 14-32 kg 
overweight 
18 months No effect of financial 
incentives or the 
interaction of financial 
incentives with food 
provision 
11% attrition 
at 6 months, 
13% at 12 
months, 15% 
at 18 months 
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and 18 months.  There were also 
optional weekly weigh-ins. 
Jeffery et al. 
(1990) 
Randomized 
experiment 
Two groups: 1) offered a weight 
control newsletter program for price of 
$5; 2) offered the same program for 
free but requiring a $60 deposit that 
would be refunded based on 
(proportional to) success in weight loss.  
 
Individuals chose weight loss goals of 
not more than 4 lb a month. 
 
Weight self-reported (questionnaire, 
telephone survey).  For subset of 
respondents, validation of self-report 
through measurement of weight. 
N=1,304 residents of 
Bloomington 
Minnesota: 
1,190 in the $5 
newsletter program 
group and 114 in 
newsletter plus 
incentive program 
group 
6 months Weight loss averaged 
about 4 lbs for $5 
program and 8 lbs for 
incentive program.  
3.8% did not 
return survey 
Kramer et 
al. (1986) 
Randomized 
controlled 
experiment 
Three groups: 1) monthly financial 
contingencies for weight maintenance; 
2) monthly financial contingencies for 
participation in training sessions to 
solidify behavioral changes; 3) no 
treatment. 
 
$120 deposit.  For each of 12 sessions 
not attended, participant forfeited $10.  
Refund also withheld if weighed more 
than “baseline” (post-first-treatment) 
weight.  Withheld refunds (forfeited 
moneys) were distributed among those 
who were at or below “baseline” 
weight at final session. 
 
Weight measured at “baseline” and at 
one year. 
N=85 individuals who 
had already lost 10% 
or more of their body 
weight through a 15-
week weight-loss 
program. 
1 year Incentives had no 
impact on weight 
maintenance / amount 
of weight regained.  
Average weight 
regain: 10.3 lbs in 
control group, 11.9 
lbs. in group with 
incentives. 
6 of 28 
(21%) of the 
incentives 
group refused 
to attend 
final weigh-
in. They self-
reported 
weight, and 5 
lbs was 
added to 
account for 
under-
reporting. 
Jeffery et al. 
(1984) 
Randomized 
controlled 
Three groups: 1) regular contract, 2) 
difficulty-grade contract; 3) no contract 
N=113 
 
15 weeks Average weight loss: 
26.2 lbs (12.8%) in 
11 subjects 
(10%) 
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experiment (control) 
 
All deposited $150. 
Immediately refunded to control group. 
Regular contract group received $30 
for each 5-lb. increment of weight loss 
Difficult-grade contract group received 
$5 for first 5 lbs lost, $10 for second, 
$20 for third, $40 for fourth, and $75 
for fifth. 
Roughly half recruited 
from population 
sample and the other 
half from newspaper 
advertisements 
difficulty-grade 
contract 
21.7 lbs (10.8%) in 
regular contract 
17.7 lbs (8.5%) in 
control group 
 
 
refused to 
attend final 
weigh-in. 
They self-
reported 
weight, and 5 
lbs was 
added to 
account for 
under-
reporting.  
Jeffery et al. 
(1983) 
Randomized 
experiment 
Six treatment groups: 3 levels of 
deposit ($30, $150, $300) times two 
types of payoff criteria: individual 
weight loss or mean group weight loss. 
 
All received 15-week behaviorally 
oriented program.  Goal was 30 
pounds lost. 
 
Cash refunds per week at rate of $1, $5, 
or $10 per pound up to 2 pounds per 
week. 
 
Monies not refunded for weight loss by 
end of program were distributed 
equally among those who achieved the 
30-pound weight loss goal. 
 
Participants were weighed weekly. 
N=89 
 
Men in the 
Minneapolis area with 
self-reported weight at 
least 30 pounds above 
the ideal. 
15 weeks Individuals rewarded 
for group performance 
lost on average 5 lbs. 
more weight.  This 
difference was 
maintained over 1 year 
follow-up. 
 
No significant effects 
of contract size. 
 
 
 
None 
Coates et al. 
(1982) 
Randomized 
experiment 
Four treatment groups: 2 incentivized 
behaviors (weight loss or decrease in 
calorie consumption) by 2 frequencies 
of therapeutic contact (5 times or 1 
time per week) 
 
N=36 
 
Adolescents at least 
10% above average 
weight-for-height. 
15 weeks The treatment group 
receiving rewards for 
weight loss and 
coming to the clinic 5 
times per week was 
the only group to 
None 
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Deposits were equal to 15 weeks’ 
allowance or 50% of earnings from 
part-time work; amounts varied from 
$15-$240 (mean=$67.75).  Source of 
payment: parents (51.5%), subjects 
(39.4%), shared (9.1%). 
 
Weight loss goal was 1 lb. per week, or 
caloric reduction necessary to lose 1 lb. 
per week.  Monetary reward was 
delivered either once per week or once 
per week at treatment center. 
 
Weighed at each clinic visit. 
Food records checked 
significantly reduce 
the percent 
overweight.  
Treatment effects 
maintained over a 6-
month follow-up 
period. 
 
Significant correlation 
between initial 
monetary deposit and 
percent overweight 
lost. 
 
No significant 
difference based on 
whether parents or 
subject paid the 
deposit 
Jeffery et al. 
(1978) 
Randomized 
controlled 
experiment. 
Three treatment groups: deposits were 
returned contingent on either 
attendance, calorie restriction, or 
weight loss.  Also a control group. 
 
Each of the three treatment groups 
deposited $200.  One group paid $20 
for losing 2 lbs. per week.  Another 
paid $20 for calorie restrictions 
calculated to cause loss of 2 lbs. per 
week.  Third group paid $20 for 
weekly attendance. 
N=31 
 
Respondents to 
newspaper 
advertisement for 
people who need to 
lose 50 lbs. or more. 
10 weeks Groups rewarded for 
weight loss or calorie 
reductions lost an 
average of 20 lbs, 
significantly more 
weight loss than either 
the group rewarded for 
attendance (8.6 lbs) or 
the control group (12.4 
lbs). 
4 of 7 in 
control group 
quit. 
Mann 
(1972) 
Single-subject 
reversal design 
Subjects deposited a large number of 
valuables (e.g. money, jewelry, medals) 
with the researcher and signed a 
Contingency Contract allowing the 
researcher to switch them from 
N=8 
 
Respondents to 
newspaper 
advertisement.  All 
Durations of 
treatments 
varied; total 
study ran at 
least 400 
Average weekly 
weight loss of 1.6 to 
1.7 pounds during 
treatment, regain of 
1.4 pounds per week 
None 
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treatment to control conditions, with 
the treatment being valuables being 
either returned or forfeited based on 
weight loss. 
 
One valuable was returned for each 2 
lb weight loss over a 2-week period. 
 
Subjects weighed every Monday, 
Wednesday, and Friday. 
agreed to lose 25 
pounds or more and 
had physician 
approval. 
days when incentives 
removed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EFFECTS OF HIGHER ADMISSION STANDARDS ON NCAA STUDENT-
ATHLETES: AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 16 
 
Abstract 
 
 This study examines the effect of an increase in minimum admissions 
standards on college enrollment and graduation rates of student-athletes. In 1996, the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) enacted Proposition 16, which 
increased admission standards for freshmen student-athletes at Division I schools, in 
an effort to improve graduation rates. Results indicate that Proposition 16 increased 
graduation rates significantly for black student-athletes, and had no significant impact 
on graduation rates for white student-athletes. Results also indicate that graduation 
rates declined for black student-athletes at Division II schools, which may have been 
driven by students transferring to Division I. As a result of the higher admission 
standards, Division I schools changed recruiting patterns and relied less on freshmen 
student-athletes, particularly black student-athletes, to fill scholarships. Even though 
fewer black freshmen student-athletes enrolled in Division I schools, the overall 
number of black student-athletes did not change, suggesting that a greater proportion 
of transfer students into Division I schools were black.  
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Introduction 
In January 1989, Georgetown was scheduled to play Boston College in a men’s 
basketball game. Right before tip-off, future Hall of Fame coach John Thompson, in 
protest of a National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) proposal, walked off the 
court and into the locker room. The proposal called for the use of standardized test 
scores to determine eligibility for student-athletes. John Thompson felt that relying 
heavily on standardized test scores for athletic eligibility and athletic financial aid 
would disadvantage black student-athletes. His protest raised the question of whether 
NCAA policies which rely on standardized test score to determine initial eligibility 
have differential impacts by race. 
 The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) asserts the pursuit of 
academic excellence as one if its core values and objectives. In accordance with this, 
the NCAA has passed several legislative policies that established eligibility 
requirements for first-time freshmen and continuing student-athletes16. In the early 
1980s, the NCAA began to use standardized test scores, in addition to high school 
GPAs, as a requirement for freshmen eligibility. In the late 1980s, the NCAA began 
discussion about increasing the initial eligibility standard through requiring a higher 
test score, GPA, and number of core classes taken in high school. It continued until the 
early 1990s, when the NCAA raised its admission standard, requiring either higher test 
scores or a higher GPA for freshmen student-athletes. This again raised the debate of 
whether relying on these measures of ability disadvantaged minority students more 
than non-minority student-athletes.  
 In this study, I examine the effects of changes in the NCAA’s policy from the 
viewpoint of universities and colleges. The NCAA policy raised the admission 
standards for student-athletes who attended schools that were a member institution of 
                                                 
16
 For a comprehensive review of NCAA eligibility policies see Covell & Barr (2001). 
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the NCAA. Student-athletes must abide by the NCAA standards to participate in inter-
collegiate athletics, regardless of their school’s admission standard. The question that I 
address is how increasing the admission standard changes the type of students that 
those schools admit. I also test whether Proposition 16 was effective in its goal of 
increasing the graduation rate of student-athletes. 
 
Proposition 48 
 The first policy enacted by the NCAA that altered admission requirements for 
student-athletes was Proposition 48. Previously, only a 2.00 high school GPA was 
required for student eligibility to participate in inter-collegiate athletics. Proposition 48 
included standardized test scores to determine initial eligibility in order to set a 
national standard to “level the playing field” of academic recruiting standards. 
Beginning with Division I schools in 1986, potential student-athletes needed to 
achieve a 700 combined score on the Standard Aptitude Test (SAT) (17 ACT) in 
addition to a 2.00 high school GPA (See Figure 3.1, top panel). By meeting these 
standards, students became eligible to practice, compete, and receive athletic financial 
aid. Proposition 48 was later implemented among Division II schools beginning with 
the 1988–1989 academic school year.  
 The NCAA released a series of reports analyzing the effects of Proposition 48 
on six-year graduation rates (NCAA Research Report Series 01, 1990). The findings 
indicate that in the three years prior to the implementation of the policy, graduation 
rates averaged 52% for all student-athletes at Division I schools. For the first cohort 
subject to the regulations of Proposition 48, graduation rates increased to 57% and  
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Prior to Proposition 16 
 
Sliding Scale of Proposition 16 
 
Figure 3.1 Eligibility Scale for Potential Student-Athletes 
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continued to rise to 59% for the entering cohort of 1988. Some of the largest increases 
in completion rates were found among minority students. Graduation rates rose 8 
percentage points for African-American students and 11 percentage points for 
Hispanic students, up to 44 and 50% respectively. From these results, the NCAA 
concluded that increasing admission standards led to significantly higher graduation 
rates.  
 While the focus of Proposition 48 was to establish a national standard of 
admissions based on indicators of college success, requiring a benchmark score on the 
SAT might have created a disadvantage for minorities. The total number of African-
American freshmen student-athletes went from 3,724 in 1985 to 3,041 in the first year 
after Proposition 48, an 18.3% decrease. In spite of this significant decrease, the total 
number of African-Americans admitted in 1986 who graduated within six years was 
virtually identical to the 1985 cohort (1,334 compared to 1,337 respectively).  
Examining recruiting behavior of Division IA football programs, Heck and Takahashi 
(2006) find that freshmen enrollment decreased after Proposition 48 and that there was 
an increase in the number of transfer students.  
 Overall, previous analyses of Proposition 48 indicate that establishing an SAT 
score cut-off in conjunction with a required high school GPA increased graduation 
rates of those admitted to Division I schools. African-Americans and Hispanics saw 
the greatest increase in six-year graduation rates. However, as a result of the policy, 
the proportion of minority freshmen student-athletes decreased dramatically. 
 
Proposition 16 
 With continued concern toward admitting students who were not prepared to 
succeed in college and graduate, the NCAA enacted Proposition 16, which took effect 
in the fall of 1996 among Division I schools, and did not apply to Division II schools. 
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Similar to its predecessor, Proposition 16 increased the admission requirement of high 
school GPA and standardized test scores, but differed by using a sliding scale. The 
sliding scale required a student who earned a 2.00 GPA to achieve at least a 1080 on 
the SAT, or it required a student who scored an 820 on the SAT to receive a 2.50 
GPA, or a linear combination of the two (see Figure 3.1, bottom panel)17. Those who 
did not meet the new sliding scale standard but still met the prior requirements were 
still eligible for athletic scholarships from Division II schools, but no longer from 
Division I. 
 Critics of Proposition 16 claimed that this policy would have differential 
effects on specific racial and ethnic groups, because it placed more weight on the SAT 
for admission into a Division I school. A National Center for Educational Statistics 
(NCES) study showed that, among high school graduates who graduated in 1992 and 
who applied to college and took the SAT (or ACT), only 46.4% of black students and 
54.1% of Hispanic students meet the standard set by Proposition 16, compared to 67% 
of white and Asian students (NCES, 1995). Other studies have shown that black 
students score significantly lower on the SAT (Hoffman & Lowitzki, 2005; Fleming, 
2002; Camara & Schmidt, 1999). In the book, Black-White Test Score Gap (Jencks & 
Phillips, 1998), Vars and Bowen find evidence that the SAT is a poorer predictor of 
college success for black students compared to white students.  Fleming (2002) 
asserts that while the SAT is a better predictor for black students who attend 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU), it is a poor predictor of college 
success for Black males who attend a non-HBCU. Sellers (1992) finds that high 
school grades are a good predictor of college GPA for black student-athletes. In 
contrast, high school grades and standardized test scores are good predictor of college 
                                                 
17
 Beginning in 1996 the SAT rescaled the scoring of the verbal and math section such that a 700 in 
1995 was equivalent to an 820 in 1996. 
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grades for white student-athletes.  
Due to the differential performance between minorities and non-minorities on 
standardized tests and lower predictive power of college performance, opponents of  
Proposition 16 brought a lawsuit against the NCAA, claiming that Proposition 16 
violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) by discriminating against minorities 
(Cureton v. NCAA). While the courts originally ruled Proposition 16 to violate Title 
VI, the ruling was later overturned in Circuit Court because, according to the ruling, 
the NCAA was not subject to Title VI's regulations since the NCAA does not receive 
federal funding.  
 The NCAA’s own research examining the effects of Proposition 16 focused 
primarily on the increases in graduation rates, comparing the year before the policy to 
the first year after the policy. Their study found that student-athletes matriculating 
under the guidelines set by Proposition 16 experienced a two percentage point increase 
in graduation rates, to an all-time high of 62% (NCAA News 2003). They break down 
the effect and show the number of black students in men’s basketball increased from 
35 to 41%. Division I-A black football players also had an increase in graduation 
rates, from 46 to 49. White student athletes in men’s basketball and football were one 
percentage point lower than the 1995 graduation rate. In this report they also note that 
as a result of the policy, the proportion of black student-athletes in the freshmen class 
fell, particularly in men’s basketball and football, by 2.9 and 3.7 percentage points 
respectively. A managing director of research for the NCAA said, “though the 
research indicates fewer black student-athletes overall, those in the system graduated 
at a higher rate than previous cohorts” (NCAA News 2003). Yet comparisons across 
just two years do not account for trends that may drive the findings. Therefore, a more 
rigorous analysis is needed to identify the true effects of the change in the policy.  
 
  109
Hypotheses 
 There are two specific hypotheses that I test in this study. First, higher 
admission standards based on a standardized test score and GPA will cause Division I 
schools to admit fewer freshmen student-athletes, particularly minorities, and enroll 
more transfer student-athletes. Second, the higher admission standard will increase 
graduation rates for all student-athletes at Division I schools, with minority-student 
athletes experiencing the greatest increase in graduation rates. 
 When admitting freshmen student-athletes, athletic departments seek to 
maximize a combination of athletic and academic ability of student-athletes. The 
specific combination is decided by each school, since it is certainly the case that some 
schools place more weight on the academic ability of student-athletes. However, 
schools face two constraints. First, student-athletes must meet a school minimum 
athletic ability to be offered an athletic scholarship. Second, student-athletes must 
meet the higher of two academic eligibility standards. The first is the standard set by 
the institution that all students must meet in order to be admitted. This varies widely 
by institution and is not always an explicit benchmark publicized by individual 
schools. The second is the standard set by the NCAA that all student-athletes must 
meet to be eligible. Many schools admit student-athletes through a special admission 
process, and often these students have significantly lower test scores than the overall 
student body population. An investigation by the Atlanta Journal Constitution reported 
that at Clemson University, UCLA, Rutgers University, Texas A&M University, 
Louisiana State University, and the University of Georgia more than half of all 
student-athletes are special admits, with University of Georgia having 73.5% of all 
student-athletes admitted this way (Knobler, 2008). Thus, it very well may be that 
even at schools with higher admission standards, the NCAA academic requirement is 
the binding constraint due to special admissions. When admitting transfer student-
  110
athletes, schools face a different admission standard based on grades in college 
courses and not on high school GPA and test scores. Between freshmen and upper 
class athletes, schools try to fill all scholarships available in a given year.  
   For a Division I school to fill their allotted number of scholarships, they 
could have either reduced the athletic ability required to be offered a scholarship or 
they could have given scholarship offers to non-freshmen student-athletes. It is 
unlikely that athletic departments would reduce the athletic ability required for 
scholarship recipients, due to possible returns to the athletic program and the 
University for having a successful athletic program. These returns include higher 
publicity, increases in SAT scores sent to the school (Pope & Pope, 2006), a better 
student environment, and increases in alumni donations to the school (Tucker, 2004; 
Baade & Sundberg, 1996; Brooker & Klastorin, 1981). Rather than admit student-
athletes with lower athletic ability, it is expected that athletic departments would turn 
to transfer students to fill the scholarships available18. Thus, it is hypothesized that 
Division I schools changed recruiting patterns by relying more on transfer student-
athletes and less on first time freshmen student-athletes to fill scholarships after the 
implementation of the policy.  
 Furthermore, it is hypothesized that with higher admission standards in place, 
graduation rates should have increased at Division I schools. This hypothesis relies on 
the assumption that with higher standards, better prepared students were admitted, and 
as a result of having better prepared students, graduation rates would have increased. 
This would correspond with the NCAA’s study examining the effect of Proposition 48 
(NCAA Research Report Series 01, 1990), as well as with other research stating that 
high school GPAs and standardized test scores are predictors of academic success at 
college (Burton & Ramist, 2001; Fleming, 2002; Betts & Morrell, 1999).  
                                                 
18
 In addition to transfer students, athletic departments could also offer scholarships to walk-ons. 
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However, the hypothesized effect of the policy on graduation rates for Division 
II schools is ambiguous. Graduation rates would increase if the student-athletes who 
no longer qualified for Division I schools academically were admitted to Division II 
schools and had higher probabilities of graduating than other student-athletes at 
Division II schools. Or it may be the case that these individuals were at the bottom of 
the ability distribution of Division I schools, and when they enrolled in Division II 
schools, they remained at the bottom of the distribution, which would decrease the 
graduation rate at their Division II schools. It is possible that although these 
individuals did not achieve the required SAT score or GPA for Division I eligibility 
they still had the ability to be successful at college, and they possessed the athletic 
ability to compete in Division I athletics. Thus, they may spend enough time at a 
Division II school to meet the requirements to transfer to a Division I school, in which 
they would then be counted as a dropout, and graduation rates would decrease at the 
Division II schools.  
 
Data  
 The data for the present analysis comes from the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association’s Graduation Report, which publishes enrollment and graduation rates for 
each member institution as mandated by the Student Right to Know Act. Individual 
institutions submit the data to the NCAA where it is reviewed by research staff. After 
a review by the NCAA, a report is published and each institution verifies the report. 
The Graduation Report is found on the NCAA website (www.ncaa.org) and was 
converted for the present study into a panel data set that consists of institutional level 
data. Five entering freshmen cohorts were used for this analysis, three cohorts prior to 
Proposition 16 (1993–1995) and two cohorts after Proposition 16 (1996–1997). In 
1993 institutional-level data was made available to the public.  
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Although data is available for cohorts past 1998, the NCAA implemented a 
program known as Academic Progress Reports, which required student-athletes to 
complete a specific fraction of their degree by each year. Punishments were also 
established for schools who received poor Academic Progress ratings, and such 
punishments could result in loss of allotted scholarships. Thus, schools might change 
the effort put forth to aid student-athletes towards completing a degree and graduation. 
While this policy did not take effect until 2005, any changes that institutions 
implemented in response to this policy would affect the six-year graduation rate of the 
1998 entering cohort. In addition to this policy change, the NCAA was also subjected 
to stricter confidentiality requirements by the Department of Education which caused 
them to suppress more data when cell sizes were small. Therefore, using more than 
two years after the policy in the analysis might not allow the study to cleanly identify 
the effects of Proposition 16 from the effects of other policies.  
 Proposition 16 only applied to those student-athletes who participated in 
Division I schools and not to those who participated in Division II. The distinction 
between divisions is made by criteria set by the NCAA based on number of 
scholarship athletes, number of sports offered, and other factors. The data contains 306 
schools in Division I and 288 schools in Division II. Furthermore, the policy only 
affected student-athletes participating in intercollegiate athletics and defines student-
athletes as full-time students who receive athletic aid19. Therefore, those schools who 
do not offer athletic aid (Division III institutions, Ivy League schools, and U.S. 
Military Academies) are excluded from this analysis.   
 To protect the privacy of individuals, the NCAA suppresses data when the 
number of enrolled student-athletes or number of student-athletes who graduate is one 
                                                 
19
 Athletic aid is defined as any grant, scholarship, tuition waiver, or any other financial assistance from 
the college or university based on a student’s athletic ability. 
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or two. If the number of enrolled student-athletes is suppressed, then the graduation 
rate is also not reported. When this is the case, I impute the number of enrollees equal 
to one and the graduation rate is still reported as missing. However, if the number 
enrolled is greater than two and the number of graduates is one or two, the graduation 
rate is not reported, but the number of enrollees is still provided. When this is the case, 
an imputed graduation rate is used such that the number of student-athlete graduates is 
equal to one20. By using this imputation method, the results on enrollment and 
graduation rate should be seen as a lower bound. 
 The first key variable of interest is the number of first time freshmen student-
athletes who enroll at a given institution. As shown on Figure 3.2, the average number 
of freshmen student-athletes at Division I and II schools increased between 1993 and 
1997. These increases over the years are also present for white student-athletes at both 
divisions. However, the average number of black student-athletes remained fairly 
constant but decreased slightly at Division I schools and slightly increased at Division 
II schools over the time span. Division I averages more student-athletes per school 
than Division II, and both types of schools experienced an increase in the average 
number of enrolled student-athletes since 1993. The total number of student-athletes at 
a school can increase for one of two reasons, the number of allotted scholarships can 
be increased by the NCAA or schools can divide a scholarship between multiple 
individuals.  
 It may be thought that it is the “big-time” sports that would be most affected by 
the stricter admission policies, namely football and basketball. Thus, examining 
individual sports would be ideal to see if the higher admission standard effected sports 
differently. The data does not provide a continuous measure of the number of  
  
                                                 
20
 Results do not change significantly when imputing the graduation rate assuming the unreported 
number is two and imputing the number of enrollees to be equal to two. 
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Figure 3.2 Enrollment Trends in the Number of Freshmen Student-Athletes 
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freshmen student-athletes by sport. What the data does provided is enrollment by 
groups (1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, and more than 20) for certain sports and then clumps 
all other sports into one category. Because of the size of the groups, men’s football is 
the only big-time sport that experiences variation between the different categories due 
to the number of football scholarships allotted. Basketball admits so few freshmen 
student athletes each year that any change in recruiting will not be detected by the bins 
that the data provides. Due to the clumping of other sports in one category21, a 
comparison between football and other non-big-time sports can be made. Even though 
many student-athletes may receive special admissions, it is believed that football 
players are the greatest benefactors of special admissions. This leads to the hypothesis 
that higher admission standards should affect the enrollment of football participants 
more than other sport participants. 
 The other key outcome of interest is six-year graduation rates, which is defined 
as the number who graduate within six years divided by the size of the entering cohort 
at a given institution. For example, the graduation rate for the entering cohort of 1995 
measures those that graduate by 2002. This measure of graduation rate is limited by 
the treatment of transfer students. Students who transfer out of a school while in good 
academic standing and graduate at another institution are considered dropouts for the 
initial school. Furthermore, students who transfer into a school are not accounted for 
with this measure of graduation rate, regardless of whether they graduate or not. One 
of the strengths of using graduation rates is that it is measured in the same way for 
student-athletes and students at each institution, thus comparisons can be made 
between the two types of students Graduation rates for student-athletes at Division I 
schools are higher than student-athletes at Division II schools. Compared to the 
                                                 
21
 For men, other sports include all sports except baseball, basketball, football, and track/cross country 
and for women other sports include all sports except basketball and track/cross country. 
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general student body population, student-athletes in both Division I and Division II 
schools experience higher graduation rates (see Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4), and rates 
have been increasing between 1993 and 1997. 
 
Methods 
 Prior to Proposition 16, schools in both Division I and II had the same 
academic requirements for student-athletes. The treatment in this analysis is the 
change in admission standards caused by the policy change of Proposition 16. With 
the implementation of Proposition 16, only Division I schools experienced an increase 
in admissions requirements. Prior to the treatment, Division I and II schools 
experienced similar trends in enrollment of student-athletes (see Figure 3.2). Due to 
these similar trends prior to the policy change, I am able to identify the effect of the 
higher admission standards on enrollment of freshmen by using a difference-in-
differences (DID) approach, using Division II as a control group. The first difference 
accounts for changes that occurred within each division. The second difference is 
between differences in changes of enrollment at Division I and Division II schools22. 
The reason for using the natural log of enrollment as the dependent variable is to be 
able to interpret the estimated coefficients as a percent change in enrollment. 
Additionally, standard errors are clustered by individual institutions. 
 With the large incentives that schools have for competing in “big time” sports, 
there is a perception that participants in these sports are most at risk of being affected 
by a higher admission standard. While the data does not allow for an analysis for 
number of freshmen student athletes, a discrete choice model will be used to estimate 
the effects of Proposition 16 on freshmen enrollment in football and other sports. The  
                                                 
22
 To account for individual institutional policies that may have affected enrollment of student-athletes, 
a third difference was taken between student-athletes and non-athletes. Results are both quantitatively 
and qualitatively similar. 
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Figure 3.3 Division I Graduation Rate Trends 
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Figure 3.4 Division II Graduation Rate Trends 
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outcome of interest is enrollment of freshmen student-athletes in the sport and takes on 
the values of 1 if there are 1–5 recruits, 2 if there are 6–10 recruits, 3 if there are 11–
15 recruits, 4 if there are 16–20 recruits, and 5 if there are more than 20 recruits.  An 
ordered probit model will be used because of the ordinal property of the dependent 
variable. Due to the small cell size of observations when dividing the sample by race, 
this will only be estimated for all freshmen student-athletes.  
 A DID approach is also used to examine the effects of Proposition 16 on 
graduation rates. However, if Proposition 16 changed the types of students who attend 
Division I and Division II schools, then Division II schools should also be seen as a 
treatment group and not as a true control. Thus when examining graduation rates, I 
will compare graduation rates of student-athletes to graduation rates of non-student-
athletes at Division I and Division II schools. By using non-student-athletes as the 
control group, I can separate the effect of Proposition 16 and any other policies that 
individual universities implemented that affect the graduation rates of the entire 
student body. For example, a university may increase student services which could 
increase the graduation rate of all the student body, including student-athletes. Since 
Division I and Division II experienced two separate treatments, I estimate the DID 
model separately by Division. Figure 3.3 shows the trends of graduation rates for 
Division I and Figure 3.4 shows the trends for Division II. Prior to the implementation 
of Proposition 16, the treatment and control groups experienced similar trends, lending 
support for the use of a DID approach.  
 As shown in Figures 3.2, 3. 3, and 3.4, there are general upward trends in both 
enrollment and graduation rate prior to 1996. A time-trend is included in all 
specifications to account for these upward trends23. It might be thought that there may 
                                                 
23
 Additionally, to account for changes in the slope after the policy, a time-trend interacted with a 
dummy variable for post is also included. The results do not change qualitatively when using this 
specification. 
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be different effects among Division IA compared to other Division I schools or 
between Bowl Championship Series (BCS) and non-BCS schools. I estimate the 
models based on these specifications, and the results indicate there are no significant 
differences among differing classifications within Division I24.  
 
Results 
 It was hypothesized that with higher admission standards for first-time 
freshmen Division I schools would decrease the enrollment of freshmen in the years 
following the implementation of Proposition 16. Results indicate that the average 
enrollment of all freshmen student-athletes at Division I schools decreased by 9.9% 
following the policy change (Table 3.1). Analyzing the results by race show that the 
average enrollment of white and black freshmen student-athletes decreased by 12.2 
and 20.1%, respectively25. The average enrollment decrease for black student-athletes 
was nearly twice as large as the effect on white student-athletes. This result provides 
support for the claim that black student-athletes were more affected by this policy. To 
check the robustness of these findings, a third difference is taken between student-
athletes and non-student-athletes, and these results indicate that after the policy change 
black student-athletes enrollment decreased by over 20% at Division I schools. 
 To further examine the effect of the NCAA policy on enrollment of freshmen 
student-athletes, the fraction of student-athletes who are freshmen is used as the 
dependent variable. During the years of analysis, the number of students with athletic 
scholarships increased, which reflects the ways schools disperse partial scholarships, 
which may cause the increase in the number of freshmen student-athletes to also 
increase. If this were the case, then the fraction of student-athletes who were freshmen  
                                                 
24
 These results are available from the author upon request. 
25
 A similar analysis is not done for other races or ethnicities due to small sample size of these groups at 
individual institutions. 
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Table 3.1 Effect of Proposition 16 on Enrollment  
 
Dependent Variable is log (enrollment)
Difference-in-Differences
Student-Athletes Total White Black
Div I * Post -0.099** -0.122** -0.201**
[0.036] [0.046] [0.063]
Div I 0.611** 0.478** 0.915**
[0.044] [0.060] [0.082]
Post 0.062 0.075 0.133
[0.039] [0.051] [0.070]
Constant 3.143** 2.829** 1.185**
[0.044] [0.058] [0.072]
time trend yes yes yes
Observations 2790 2626 2505
Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences
Total White Black
Ath * Div I * Post -0.150** -0.099* -0.245**
[0.043] [0.049] [0.079]
Ath * Div I -0.532** -0.608** -0.135
[0.065] [0.075] [0.100]
Ath * Post 0.178** 0.179** 0.118
[0.040] [0.041] [0.070]
Div I * Post 0.051 -0.023 0.044
[0.026] [0.048] [0.063]
Div I 1.143** 1.087** 1.050**
[0.064] [0.087] [0.121]
Post -0.088** -0.092* 0
[0.024] [0.042] [0.062]
Ath -2.807** -2.761** -2.191**
[0.056] [0.063] [0.078]
Constant 5.972** 5.599** 3.364**
[0.051] [0.070] [0.098]
time trend yes yes yes
Observations 5555 5222 4944
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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should not change. As presented in Table 3.2, Division I schools experienced a 
decrease of 2.8% in the fraction of freshmen student-athletes. The effect is being 
driven by the decreases in the fraction of black student-athletes who are freshmen, a 
3.2% decrease. Taking a third difference with the fraction of the student-body who are 
freshmen shows that these results are robust. These findings suggest that even if the 
number of scholarships is increasing over time, the fraction of student-athletes who are 
freshmen is decreasing after Proposition 16. 
 There are two groups that should not be affected by this policy and an analysis 
of these groups can serve as falsification tests. The first of these groups is the total 
number of student-athletes. Each school is allotted a specific number of scholarships, 
and a DID estimation should show no change in the total number of scholarship 
student-athletes. Table 3.3 shows that there were no significant changes in the total 
number of student-athletes, particularly no change in the total number of black 
student-athletes. The measure of total number of student-athletes includes freshmen, 
thus for the total number of black student-athletes to remain unchanged, there must be 
an increase in the number of black transfer students to account for the decrease in the 
number of black freshmen. The other group that should not be affected by this policy 
is freshmen non-student-athletes. As shown in Table 3.4, there is no significant 
changes at Division I schools after the policy change. These two examples indicate 
that the policy did not have an effect on groups which were not subject to its 
requirements. 
 Focusing on individual sports, football, which has more student-athletes than 
any other sport, shows similar patterns of reductions in the number of recruits at 
Division I schools. Average marginal effects from an ordered logit estimation indicate 
that most of the change occurred from decreases in the probability of enrolling more 
freshmen recruits at Division I schools (Table 3.5). As hypothesized, the policy had no  
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Table 3.2 Effect of Proposition on Enrollment 
 
Dependent Variable is Fraction of Students who are Freshmen
Difference-in-Differences
Total White Black
Div I * Post -0.028* -0.011 -0.038*
[0.013] [0.015] [0.017]
Div I -0.01 -0.017 0.005
[0.011] [0.011] [0.013]
Post -0.01 -0.016 -0.017
[0.016] [0.017] [0.020]
Constant 0.236** 0.253** 0.236**
[0.011] [0.012] [0.013]
time trend yes yes yes
Observations 2695 2530 2400
Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences
Total White Black
Ath * Div I * Post -0.040* -0.018 -0.070**
[0.016] [0.017] [0.020]
Ath * Div I -0.001 -0.011 0.018
[0.012] [0.013] [0.015]
Ath * Post 0.008 0.004 0.019
[0.014] [0.015] [0.018]
Div I * Post 0.012 0.006 0.032**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.011]
Div I -0.009 -0.006 -0.013
[0.005] [0.006] [0.008]
Post -0.014 -0.015 -0.034**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010]
Ath 0.054** 0.073** 0.039**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.012]
Constant 0.186** 0.184** 0.199**
[0.006] [0.007] [0.009]
time trend yes yes yes
Observations 5267 4943 4672
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 3.3 Enrollment of All Student-Athletes 
 
Dependent Variable is log (enrollment)
Difference-in-Differences
Total White Black
Div I * Post -0.032 -0.022 -0.008
[0.035] [0.046] [0.046]
Div I 0.590** 0.471** 0.880**
[0.044] [0.077] [0.078]
Post 0.05 0.065 0.041
[0.041] [0.054] [0.050]
Constant 4.698** 4.257** 2.667**
[0.040] [0.061] [0.063]
time trend yes yes yes
Observations 2855 2765 2790
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Freshmen Enrollment of Non-Student-Athletes 
 
Dependent Variable is log (enrollment)
Difference-in-Differences
Total White Black
Div I * Post 0.051 -0.023 0.044
[0.026] [0.048] [0.063]
Div I 1.143** 1.087** 1.050**
[0.064] [0.087] [0.121]
Post -0.060* -0.08 -0.016
[0.024] [0.044] [0.065]
Constant 5.995** 5.608** 3.351**
[0.052] [0.072] [0.100]
time trend yes yes yes
Observations 2765 2596 2439
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 3.5 Effect of Proposition 16 on Enrollment by Sport 
 
Average Marginal Effects of an Ordered Logit
Enroll 1 to 5 Freshmen   Football Male Other Sports Female Other Sports
Division I * Post 0.044** -0.016 0
[0.016] [0.018] [0.010]
Division I -0.124** 0.015** -0.251**
[0.017] [0.010] [0.002]
Post -0.03 0.001 0.008*
[0.024] [0.022] [0.011]
Enroll 6 to 10 freshmen Football Male Other Sports Female Other Sports
Division I * Post 0.034* 0.001 -0.001
[0.016] [0.004] [0.001]
Division I -0.111** -0.195** 0.012**
[0.009] [0.001] [0.001]
Post -0.021 0.001 -0.038*
[0.013] [0.014] [0.004]
Enroll 11 to 15 Freshmen  Football Male Other Sports Female Other Sports
Division I * Post -0.026** 0.01 0
[0.009] [0.001] [0.001]
Division I 0.082** 0.124** 0.019**
[0.011] [0.002] [0.006]
Post 0.019 -0.008 0.024*
[0.015] [0.002] [0.001]
Enroll 15 to 20 Freshmen Football Male Other Sports Female Other Sports
Division I * Post -0.033* 0.004 -0.002
[0.014] [0.001] [0.016]
Division I 0.100** 0.042** 0.168**
[0.007] [0.007] [0.001]
Post 0.021 0.002 0.002*
[0.014] [0.002] [0.017]
Enroll more than 20 FreshmenFootball Male Other Sports Female Other Sports
Division I * Post -0.019* 0.001 0.003
[0.009] [0.011] [0.004]
Division I 0.052** 0.014** 0.052**
[0.004] [0.001] [0.008]
Post 0.011 0.005 0.003*
[0.007] [0.005] [0.001]
Controlled for time trend yes yes yes
Observations 3208 4666 5256
Standard errors in brackets,
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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measurable effect on admission of other athletic recruits. These results come with 
limitations; variation does not come from a change in the number, but only changes 
across bins.  For example, a change in going from 16 to 15 recruits is measured the 
same as going from 20 to 11 recruits, and a change from 20 to 15 is not picked up by 
the measurement. Therefore, even though the results suggest a statistically significant 
change between the categories of football recruits, it is not possible to measure the 
actual change in number of recruits. 
 Taken as a whole, these results provide evidence that, as a result of higher 
initial eligibility standards, Division I schools changed their recruiting patterns. They 
relied less on freshmen to fill scholarships, particularly black freshmen, and they 
relied more on transfer students.  
 The objective of Proposition 16 was to admit students who were academically 
prepared to succeed at the institutions they attended. The measure of success that was 
of primary importance was graduation rate. The difference-in-differences approach 
indicates that overall graduation rate for student-athletes at Division I schools were not 
significantly different than from non-student-athletes (See Table 3.6). This indicates 
that the changes in the mean graduation rate from before the policy to after the policy 
is due to institutional policies and not Proposition 16. However, Proposition 16 had 
significant effects on graduation rates at Division II schools. Compared to black non-
student-athletes at Division II schools, black student-athletes experienced an 8.8 
percentage point decline in graduation rates as a result of Proposition 16. 
Ex ante, it was unclear what effect the policy would have on the graduation 
rate of Division II student athletes. It was proposed that it depended on where the non-
qualifying students fit in the distribution of the Division II schools they attended. This 
number might suggest that student-athletes who were deemed unprepared to succeed 
at Division I schools, as s result of their test score and GPA, were unprepared to  
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Table 3.6 Effect of Proposition 16 on Graduation Rates 
 
Dependent Variable is graduation rate * 100
Difference-in-Differences
Division I Schools Total White Black
Student-Athlete * Post 0.294 0.555 -0.208
[0.504] [0.935] [0.702]
Student-Athlete 4.872** 9.156** 7.021**
[0.593] [0.723] [0.760]
Post 0.225 -1.404 0.083
[0.459] [0.908] [0.624]
Constant 51.782** 39.222** 54.171**
[1.132] [1.126] [1.178]
Observations 3007 2536 2896
Control for time trend yes yes yes
Division II Schools Total White Black
Student-Athlete * Post -0.18 -1.233 -8.779**
[1.131] [1.289] [2.330]
Student-Athlete 11.315** 13.031** 32.822**
[0.787] [1.149] [1.920]
Post 0.751 1.027 0.019
[1.074] [1.168] [2.203]
Constant 41.399** 38.824** 24.939**
[1.220] [1.336] [1.835]
Observations 2304 2903 1979
Control for time trend yes yes yes
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
 
 
succeed academically at a Division II school. While this may be the case, an  
alternative explanation for these results is that non-qualifying students who attended 
Division II schools possessed the athletic ability to compete at Division I schools. 
Thus, once they completed an academic year of college, they were no longer subject to 
initial eligibility requirements and could transfer into a Division I school based on 
college performance, and not standardized test scores. These transfer students would 
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then count as non-graduators and, as a result, the graduation rate would decrease at 
Division II schools.  A back of the envelope calculation shows that the 8% decrease 
in black student-athletes can be caused by an average of 1 student for every two 
Division II schools to transfer to a Division I school (an increase of 144 transfer 
students). This calculation shows that a small number of students can cause a 
significant change, and lends further support that Division I schools rely more on 
transfer students after the increase in freshmen eligibility requirements. 
   
Conclusion 
 The objective of Proposition 16 was to increase graduation rates at Division I 
schools by increasing the required grade point average and test scores of entering 
freshmen student-athletes. The results of this study indicate that these higher standards 
had no real effect on the average graduation rates for Division I student-athletes. 
However, due to higher academic standards required for eligibility, athletic 
departments relied less on freshmen and more on transfer students to fill scholarships. 
This is evident in the decline in the number of freshmen enrolled as well as the 
fraction of student athletes who are freshmen at Division I schools but no change in 
the total number of student-athletes. 
 Opponents of Proposition 16 argued that by relying more on standardized test 
scores for admittance to Division I schools, minority student-athletes would be 
affected more so than non-minority student-athletes. This study indicates that 
enrollment of black freshmen student-athletes decreased as a result of the policy. 
However, the total number of black student-athletes did not decrease, indicating that 
more black transfer students were recipients of athletic scholarship after Proposition 
16. 
 One question that this study cannot answer, but attempts to shed light on: are 
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potential student-athletes better off as a result of this policy? Although this study 
reports changes in school level enrollment and graduation rates, its inability to track 
students over time does not allow it to examine choices by individuals. With 
individual-level data, an analysis can be conducted to examine how Proposition 16 
affected the choices of the individual with regards to enrollment, persistence, and 
graduation. 
 The other question that needs to be addressed is what standard can or should 
the NCAA use to determine initial eligibility of freshmen student-athletes? 
Standardized test scores are a low-cost option that has limitations, but what other 
alternatives are there? It was suggested that the NCAA determine eligibility on a case 
by case basis, but due to the number of student-athletes this is not at all practical. 
Recently, many colleges have begun to rely less on the SAT/ACT and some have even 
dropped it all together (most notably Wake Forest University). The admission process 
at these schools may serve as useful examples of ways in which a standard could be 
set without requiring standardized test scores. 
 All in all, the policies established by the NCAA have attempted to emphasize 
the academic portion of the student-athlete equation. Graduation rates have continued 
to rise for student-athletes over the years and are significantly higher than overall 
student-body graduation rates. However, caution should be used when using only 
graduation rate as a measure of policy success. As seen with Proposition 16, when 
only graduation rates are examined, many other aspects of the educational process that 
play an integral role in evaluating the effectiveness of policies may be overlooked. 
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CONCLUSION AND EXTENSIONS 
 
In conclusion, this dissertation contains three distinct empirical chapters. Each 
chapter focuses on an issue pertaining to the economics of education or health. For 
each chapter, I plan on extending my current analyses through the following research 
outlined below. 
Chapter 1 examines the effect of instructor race and gender on persistence in 
STEM fields. I plan on extending my current analysis on this topic in several different 
ways. First, the current study focuses on first semester courses and transitions between 
majors after the first semester and first year. I plan to examine the effect of courses 
taken after the first semester and transitions that occur within the first two years of 
college. I also plan to model the full decision process that students face between 
persisting in a STEM field, changing major, or dropping out. Second, I plan to analyze 
the type of selection that occurs when students are able to select their own courses. To 
do this, I will use data from a large public university which randomly assigned 
students to sections of courses and then changed its assignment policy by allowing 
students to select their own schedule of courses. Utilizing this change of policy, I will 
be able to identify the type of selection that occurs based on observable characteristics 
of faculty. Finally, I plan to work with Doug Weber and Ron Ehrenberg on an analysis 
of how expenditures other than instructional expenditures affect graduation and 
persistence rates.  
Chapter 2 analyzes a program that offers financial incentives for weight loss. 
With coauthor John Cawley, I will be extending the analysis to further examine the 
outcomes of attrition and weight loss. We are planning on implementing a hazard 
model to estimate factors that predict attrition. We will also be using regression 
analyses to control for observable characteristics that are correlated with weight loss. 
  133
In our current analysis we focus on the first year that the program was implemented. 
However, multiple worksites continued using the program past the first year, which 
will allow us to examine longer term outcomes of the programs in future research  
Chapter 3 analyzes the effects of the NCAA’s Proposition 16 on enrollment and 
graduation rates of student-athletes. This policy focused on initial eligibility 
requirements, subsequent NCAA policies, most notably the Progress-Toward-Degree 
Rule, have focused on increasing retention and graduation rates of student-athletes. I 
hypothesize that student-athletes will sort into majors that make it easier for 
institutions to comply with graduation benchmarks established by the NCAA. I plan to 
use data from multiple institutions to examine the distribution of student-athletes 
across majors and test this hypothesis. 
